Gerhardt Máté: Prime Minister, before the summit you said you were expecting a cage fight – a long and tough struggle. What was today like?
It was worse than a traditional cage fight, because at least there you fight one-on-one; but here there were plenty of opponents. It felt more like pro wrestling, where there are no fixed rules and the word “fairness” isn’t even understood. We had a debate, and we came under heavy attack from the Croatians, from the Commission and from the Germans on the issue of the war. And at the same time, the Hungarian opposition is urging us to adopt the Brussels line on the war and to break away from Russian gas and oil. So there was kicking here inside the cage, and also from behind – from Budapest. There were two or three others in addition to me; it would be worth seeing what state they’re in now. Personally, I feel that I’m all right.
What’s it like on the inside? How do they try, for instance, to persuade Hungary – or you personally – to abandon your veto and not stand in the way of Ukraine’s EU accession?
There are intelligent attempts, and then there are the chaotic ones – more reminiscent of a pub brawl down a dark alley or on the outskirts of town, with knives drawn. Now, the intelligent ones argue – quite convincingly – that our situation is untenable: twenty-six want to admit Ukraine, we don’t, and we’re not even allowing the negotiations to start. They suggest that instead of unanimity, a qualified majority should be enough to open each chapter, while closing them would still require unanimity: “So, Dear Viktor, don’t block the start of the talks – block them at the end.” But I wasn’t born yesterday. What they’d do is open the clusters, the negotiation chapters, one after another, rush through them all, and then pile enormous pressure on me: they’d say there’s only one step left, just one Hungarian approval needed, and then everything everyone else wants would be done. Still, at least that’s an intelligent method: it’s an offer, a proposal. I don’t accept it, I can say why it’s not good, but it’s intelligent. But there are others who bluntly say that Hungary has no moral right to act like this, or that it’s Hungary’s duty to comply. Or, as they said today, that Ukraine is Europe’s first line of defence. So I have to say that it’s not like that: “Maybe it is for you, but Hungary doesn’t regard Ukraine as the first line of military defence against Russia, and we never have.” Some say that this is a war that the Ukrainians are fighting for us; I have to tell them no, they’re not fighting for us, we didn’t ask them to, and we don’t want that, thank you very much. So attempts come from different directions and in different forms, which we must answer calmly, coolly, and intelligently and politely if possible – but in every case astutely and firmly. Hungary can’t afford any inconsistency, contradiction or weak spot in its position, so we must keep our wits about us. By the time we get to the end of the day, where we are now, I feel as if my brain has turned to sawdust – and on top of that I usually have to do this not in Hungarian but in English. So by the evening one is worn out.
Yes, it’s interesting to read what von der Leyen says and what the Polish prime minister says: that now Ukraine is fighting our war, Europe’s war, that the Union and Europe are at war. What does this mean in a legal sense? Why do these EU leaders think or say this?
It’s the exertion of pressure, and it’s nonsense. It isn’t like that, because as long as even one Member State isn’t at war, and we’re not at war, the Union can’t be at war either. But in terms of the quality of the debate, today was particularly good, because the other side presented its position eloquently and with refinement. They said, in effect, that the Ukrainians are winning on the front line: over the past year the Russians have barely gained any territory, the Ukrainians are fighting heroically, and they’ll turn the tide of the war. The Americans have now thrown their weight behind the Ukrainians, which means there will be weapons, and our duty is simply to support this war to the very end. This is because, the argument goes, Russia will run out of money and economic strength, there will be discontent in Russia, and the Russians will therefore lose the war. Then negotiations can take place. I patiently listened to all that and said that I understand that it’s a hypothesis – that the Russians could exhaust their reserves sooner than we do, whether in manpower, money or economic performance; but could they tell me how many years it will be before that happens? And if we know how many years it will be, how many billion euros will it cost? At that point there was silence. So today there’s a strategy in the European Union that aims to defeat Russia in a war of attrition. Sadly the fact that in the process tens of thousands – or even hundreds of thousands – of Ukrainians might die doesn’t come up in this conversation. The essential point is that they imagine it as a war of materiel, a war of resources – and they believe that we Europeans will win that war. Our strategy – the Hungarian strategy – is completely different. We don’t agree with this – things shouldn’t be done that way. But at least now the European Union has a publicly stated and articulated war strategy, something we can respond to. In my view, the majority of Europeans are closer to our position. We’re saying that this isn’t the right approach, that there’s no solution on the front line. Hundreds of thousands of people will die on both sides. The European Union will burn through vast sums of money – we’ll buy the Americans’ weapons and hand them to the Ukrainians. We won’t profit from this – America will, but we won’t. And the entire European economy, already struggling with competitiveness problems, will continue its downward slide, because the money is flowing out to Ukraine. Therefore, instead of hoping for victory on the front line, we should sit down, send a delegation to the Russians, and propose EU–Russia talks. The war in Ukraine would, of course, be an important part of those talks, but not the only part – and not even the most important part. We should negotiate a long-term agreement with the Russians about a new European security system, within which Ukraine’s place would also have to be found. But we shouldn’t start from Ukraine’s position, nor from the war itself, but from the fact that Europe’s security system has collapsed. We’re in trouble, essentially living under the shadow of a world war. This is good for no one. Let’s put an end to it, establish a power equilibrium through an agreement, and bring peace back to Europe. That’s the Hungarian proposal – but it doesn’t currently have a majority.
How much has the war cost Hungary so far? Is there any calculation for that? We know how much the EU has sent, but how much has it cost Hungary?
There are various estimates. We know how much we’ve lost because of the sanctions. We also know how much we’ve lost due to high inflation and high energy prices. But since the EU keeps sending money to Ukraine, sometimes as loans, sometimes as grants, what’s harder to calculate is exactly how much of that money comes from Hungary. But we’re talking about tens of billions of euros.
Another important question is what they see in Ukraine’s potential EU membership – a business and financial opportunity, or an ideological struggle? Why is there such a strong push to make Ukraine a member of the Union at all costs?
I have a more complex explanation. I believe that the Brusselites – the Brussels bureaucrats – want this war because it gives them an excuse to centralise power. By invoking the war, they can take even more powers away from the Member States and borrow vast sums of money in their name, creating collective debt. And if collective debt is created, then the days of independent nation states are numbered – after all, the United States of America was also created through collective debt. So they think that the war itself will give a push, a thrust, new momentum to progress towards the long-term goal of a United States of Europe. So there are those who support it for this reason. Others support it because they smell money. I can see those who sell weapons, the arms industry – they’re in it for the money. Then there are the Soros-type figures lurking in the background, who hope that if Russia really does lose the war – if it’s Russia that tires first in this war of attrition – and discontent and chaos arise inside Russia, then the opportunity that existed under Yeltsin will open up again, and they’ll be able to go into Russia with big money and make vast fortunes. I think there is such a group: a transatlantic circle hoping for that. And then there are various countries that genuinely fear the Russians – I’m thinking of the Baltics, for example. They believe that the more exhausted the Russians become, the more their army is weakened, the safer they’ll be. So with the Baltics there’s another factor altogether. What I’m getting at is that it’s not that there are two or three people sitting somewhere in the dark pulling all the strings. Instead of that the war was ignited, and different groups have latched onto it – each of them trying to cook their own meals over that fire.
The question of Russian oil and gas is an interesting one. President Trump has spoken about what options Hungary has. But at the same time the Croatian foreign minister has said that Hungary is a profiteer, a beneficiary of the war. How would you respond to that? This isn’t just an economic or ideological issue – it’s one of energy security. So what’s the right answer from Hungary’s point of view?
First of all, I’ve tried not to raise this dispute with the Croatians to the prime-ministerial level. The Croats are our friends – after all, we lived together in one state for eight hundred years, and we’ll need each other in the future as well. We have good economic relations. The border between our two countries has essentially disappeared, and people can move and trade freely. We’re now connecting our motorways at another location. Hungarian tourism in Croatia is huge. Huge amounts of goods come up from Croatia and go towards the European Union, which brings us revenue. So both countries have every reason to cooperate and to like one another. I didn’t want to elevate this dispute – and it’s a serious dispute – to the prime-ministerial level, but at the Council meeting today the Croatian prime minister attacked me, so I was forced to push back. What’s this about? It’s about two products that are vital for Hungary: gas and oil. Right now we’re talking about oil. The oil arrives via the Druzhba [Friendship] crude-oil pipeline from Russia. We have no coastline, so oil and gas can only reach us by pipeline. The Croats say that they have a pipeline too, and that if we brought non-Russian oil up from their seaport through that pipeline, it could supply Hungary and Slovakia. And when it comes to refineries, there’s both Százhalombatta and Bratislava/Pozsony – and both are operated by MOL. First of all, as far as we know, the Croatian pipeline’s capacity is far from sufficient to meet our two countries’ oil needs. There’s a dispute about exactly how much that pipeline can carry. We understand that two tests showed it can’t satisfy the needs of both countries, but the Croats say it can. The other issue is price. There are two prices. One is the price at which we buy the oil – and Russian oil delivered by pipeline is cheaper than shipping it by sea to Croatia and then bringing it up here. That’s one area where we’d lose out. The other is the transit cost, because you have to pay a pipeline fee. Calculating for the same volume, the transport tariff for the pipeline running from Trieste to Vienna is only a quarter of what the Croats are asking us to pay to bring oil from Croatia. They claim that our calculations are wrong. So there’s a very tangled business dispute about the exact figures. The point is that Hungary needs the Croatian pipeline as a supplementary supply, through which we can bring up two to three million tonnes of oil; but we can’t bring up the fourteen million tonnes we require. So we need a major pipeline, and that main route comes from Russia. We’re grateful to the Croats for their help, and we’ll need it – but we can’t replace Russian oil supplies with theirs. The gas question is even clearer: we bring in gas via Türkiye, and there’s no other route that can deliver that quantity to Hungary with the same level of security. Then there’s the debate about whether this is right for us, because they say that by buying from Russia we’re financing Russia’s war expenditure. But I’ve looked at the numbers: we account for only 2, 3, 4 or 5 per cent of Russia’s oil and gas trade. Meanwhile Western European countries are buying large quantities of LNG – liquefied natural gas – delivered on Russian ships re-labelled as Indian, Chinese or Turkish. In order to avoid controversy, I won’t mention their names for the moment, but these are large countries, and through this roundabout route – in reality buying Russian oil and gas – they pay far more than we do through transparent, direct trade.
A very important question is whether it’s possible to normalise Hungary’s current very tense and very bad relationship with Ukraine. There will be another EU summit on 23 October. It’s clear that Hungarian politics is under immense pressure, and the Ukrainians are attacking Hungary extremely aggressively. Do you still see any possibility – or how do you assess the possibility – of settling this relationship and steering it onto a slightly calmer or more normal course?
First of all, there’s the question of Ukraine’s EU membership. On this, Hungary’s position is clear. The Hungarian people took part in a referendum and spoke: they do not want to see Ukraine in the Union. More precisely: Hungary does not want Ukraine to belong to any form of shared integration or framework – neither in NATO nor in the European Union. What we do offer them is a strategic agreement. So we don’t want Ukraine to be left to its own devices, but membership is out of the question. How are they behaving now? As if they’re the ones giving orders. What will it be like if they become members? So we don’t want to be in the EU together with the Ukrainians, because that would mean the Ukrainians bringing war into the Union and taking money out of the Union and into Ukraine. For Hungary that’s the worst-case scenario, and we don’t support it. But we can establish a strategic partnership, covering trade in goods, energy, many issues, and perhaps even security; but certainly without granting membership rights – because once you’re a member, those rights can no longer be taken away from you. And Ukraine’s economic impact on the Union is something the effects of which can’t be calculated precisely – if we get it wrong, we’ll be ruined. This is why it’s better not to admit them, but instead conclude a strategic agreement. As for the relationship itself, Ukraine will only have a balanced relationship with Hungary when Ukraine itself reaches a point of stability. But today Ukraine is a country on the edge – we don’t know what we’re dealing with! How many people are these Ukrainians? We don’t know their population – millions have fled to Russia, millions to Western Europe, and we don’t even know the population of our neighbour. This will also obstruct membership. We don’t know the size of the country – not just its population, but also its territory. Where are its borders? The Russians have occupied about a fifth – will those be the borders? So until Ukraine settles down, its relations will remain this tense. Once agreements are reached, we’ll know where Ukraine is, how large it is, within what agreement framework, and how it will function – and this will also bring about balanced Ukrainian–Hungarian cooperation.
Why do you think the Hungarian opposition so strongly supports Ukraine’s accession? Why do they argue for it, and why do they claim that it’s necessary?
First of all, they like the Ukrainians. I feel there’s an emotional attachment. The relationship of the Hungarian population with Ukraine is complicated, and not everyone likes them. Within the opposition, there are people who clearly do. On the other hand, with this they’re really serving Brussels. So even when their sympathy is taken into account, they haven’t independently concluded that Ukraine should be admitted – it’s rather that Brussels is demanding that the Ukrainians be admitted. And since the obstacle to this is the Hungarian national government, and sometimes me personally, the aim is to remove the Hungarian national government and me, and to put in our place a pro-Ukrainian government that will say what Brussels wants. This sounds very simple, but believe me, it isn’t any more complicated than that. Brussels simply wants a government in Hungary that’s compliant on the issue of Ukraine.
What kind of day are you expecting tomorrow? The meeting is continuing. Will it be the same sort of “cage fight”, the same sort of back-alley brawl that you mentioned earlier?
No, the plenary session will be much more elegant. It will be a wider circle. It won’t just be the prime ministers of the EU member states: the Turks will also be there; I’ve already seen the British prime minister; and Azerbaijan is here too. So it will be a larger, broader group – and even Zelenskyy might arrive. Therefore the approach is always broader, less specific, less confrontational. But it won’t be an easy day, because I’ll also have a number of side meetings: bilateral talks on the margins of the main council session, requested by people with whom we clearly don’t share the same agenda. For example, tomorrow I’ll be meeting the Croatian prime minister. Those will be the tougher ones.
If the Ukrainian president comes, will you sit down with him as well?
There are no such plans. We’d like such a meeting, preparations have begun, but the quality of the preparations is still far from reaching the point at which it would make sense for the two leaders to sit down together. It may be that in the plenary session he’ll attack us – Hungary and Slovakia. Today he addressed us – the European prime ministers – via video link, and he explicitly attacked Hungary and Slovakia. If he repeats that tomorrow in the plenary, then of course I’ll defend my country – I’ll stand my ground and respond.
Thank you very much, Prime Minister.
Thank you too.