Good afternoon everyone.
I’m delighted to be here again. I’m sure that everyone here is interested in what I’m going to talk about – and so am I. Obviously this is what everyone is most interested in; it’s called “Victory Plan 2026”. This was completed in the summer, and obviously we’re here together so that I can talk about this – or about this too. But this year’s meeting isn’t like the ones we’ve become accustomed to in previous years, because now everyone can see and hear us. This won’t change what we want to talk about and what we want to say, but it will change how we do it. So this year the best parts of previous speeches in Kötcse will be missing. I must respectfully point out that taunts, snide remarks and all kinds of trolling – which have been part and parcel of the Kötcse picnic – are prohibited. This is because now we’re going out live, and this requires not only seriousness from all of us, but also caution. We must be careful with our words. But despite that, this year’s season opener in Kötcse is also a political season opener. We’ve made it public, and let’s admit that the reason for this is mainly because of our opponents. This isn’t because anyone has the power to force us to do anything, but simply because our opponents have come up with the two most important phrases of the upcoming political season: “I can’t say what I think because we’ll lose the election” was one of them; and “We haven’t talked about it, but after the election, anything’s possible.” With this, our opponents have introduced secrecy and concealment into this political season; and we can only respond with openness. We’re laying our cards on the table. We believe that those who walk in the shadows and darkness have bad intentions – while we have only good intentions. This is why this year we’ve organised a completely open Kötcse picnic. We can be proud that we’ve always done what we’ve said we’d do, and what we’ve said we’d do, we’ve accomplished. And we intend to continue doing so in the future. Just to refresh our memories: we promised to send the IMF back home – they’re back home; we promised one million jobs; we promised a Hungary free of migrants; we promised to stay out of the war, to protect our children, to support families, to reduce taxes; and we also promised to restore the 13th month’s pension. And we’ve done everything we said we’d do. This is what constitutes the essence of politics – and in politics the most important thing is trust. It’s for this reason, and no other, that we’ve won – and continue to win – elections: because of the trust placed in us, the trust we’ve worked for and earned.
As I see it, Ladies and Gentlemen, this will also be the key to the election ahead of us. The election will be about who can be trusted. Our opponents have completely lost the trust of the people. Gyurcsány and his colleagues were smarter, because it was after the election when they admitted that they’d deceived the people – while Tisza’s admission that they’ll deceive the people is being said before the election. I could even say that they’re offering us their own heads on silver platters; well, if they’re offering them to us, then, as a civic community, let’s accept them. In politics a loss of trust has consequences – not only in terms of the final outcome, but also in terms of the political process itself. Because what political options remain for those who have lost people’s trust? Nothing said by those who have lost the trust of others will be believed. So what remains to them? What remains is troublemaking, what remains is provocation. This is how parties that have lost people’s trust create the politics of disorder – not only in Hungary but elsewhere too. We can see this happening here today. What is happening? Hungary has an area of 93,000 square kilometres; but in this country there’s only one village suitable for the Tisza Party to come together and hold a meeting for its own people – the place where we always are, and where we meet every year at a pre-announced time. Why are they coming here? They’re coming here because no one believes what they say anymore; but when they come here, there will be tension, conflict and controversy – that’s all that’s left to them. We have to be prepared for this; this is what their politics will consist of for the next seven months. We can call this “little cockerel politics”. Little cockerel politics has three defining features, which we’ve just discovered as part of the theory of political systems. The essence of little cockerel politics is pomp and posturing: pumped-out chests and pumped-up talk. An important element of little cockerel politics is that the little cockerel is always at the centre of the universe, and he thinks that if he doesn’t crow, the sun won’t rise. But the best thing about little cockerel politics is its third aspect: the little cockerel will never become a full-grown rooster.
What am I going to talk about? That question intrigues me too. As Chuck Norris would say, “Everything as well”. And as I’ll be talking about everything, this will be longer than usual. A Székely woman calls her daughter and asks, “How did the birth go?” The daughter says, “It went well, but I had to set aside the whole day.” Well, we can’t devote the whole day to my speech – mainly because my wife and I are celebrating our 39th wedding anniversary today, and I have to be home by this evening. We’re celebrating today, but it should have been yesterday – except yesterday I had to fulfil my national duties in Dublin. At least I’ll be home tonight.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
What did we talk about last year? Last year we essentially talked about intellectual matters – which I’ll recapitulate now, if I may. Last year we put forward a thesis which stated that what we call Western civilisation is no longer to be found in Western Europe, but only in Central Europe. And only Central Europe can save Western civilisation. That was the thesis of our address last year. We also said that for us the West is a civilization whose uniqueness lies in its exceptional intertwining of faith and reason. The Western world is kept alive by the idea that faith and reason can assist each other in understanding the truth. Because there are things that can only be known through reason, and there are things that can only be known through revelation. The goal, we said, is to be clear that whatever the situation in Western Europe, we cannot return to the Christian civilisation that existed before the Enlightenment. That’s impossible. But neither do we want living faith and the Christian tradition to be eliminated from European life. Last year we asked this question: What is happening in Western Europe now? In Western Europe the philosophical foundations of Western civilisation have been shaken, a new power system has been built: a liberal civilisation. And in Western Europe it’s no longer possible to turn this liberal civilisation into Western civilisation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, liberal civilisation has built up such a strong machinery of power that currently it seems unshakeable. Secondly, the formation of parallel societies has advanced – to put it politely; to put it more bluntly, I’d call this the Islamisation of Western Europe. Therefore what we understand as Western civilization – as a unique combination of reason and faith – no longer has a place in Western Europe. It still exists in Central Europe, and since we have Central Europe’s most proactive government and political system, we Hungarians have a mission that extends beyond day-to-day politics toward keeping Western civilization alive in Central Europe – a mission that we acknowledge, understand, and proudly embrace. Since we discussed all this last year, we don’t need to talk about such intellectual matters again this year. However, we do need to talk about prospects, political and global political prospects, so that we can place current politics in the appropriate context in terms of time and space. Therefore, in the first part of my address, we’ll try to make out the big picture by switching on our headlights – or, as our Székely brothers and sisters would say, “long beam”. In the second part of my address we’ll switch to dipped or low-beam headlights and shine them on the road immediately in front of our wheels, so that we can avoid potholes: then I’ll be talking about the situation in Hungary.
During discussions at our Kötcse meeting last year we left many questions unanswered. In 2025 we received answers to almost all of the questions left unanswered back then, and most of the assumptions we made at this time last year have been confirmed by events. Let me recap. Will there be a new American president and new policy? This is still in September 2024. Yes, there would be. Will there be a new German government? Yes, there would be. Will France emerge from the vortex of its government crises? No. In Poland will there be a power shift, or at least a balancing of power? Yes. Can the V4 return and rise again? Yes. Will there be a Russian military victory? We asked this last year. Yes. Last year we asked whether Ukraine would be divided up. Yes. Will the BRICS group of countries continue to strengthen? If you’ve seen the meeting in Beijing, you know the answer: yes. And will the EU succeed in resolving the fundamental dilemma embodied by the euro? No. These were the questions, and these are the answers we’ve received.
In more detail. The United States has a new president, but more importantly, it also has a new political, international and geopolitical strategy. What the Americans are doing today is based on the simple recognition that if the global trade order remains as we’ve known it and experienced it over the past thirty to forty years, then the rivals of the United States will become stronger than the United States: they’ll overtake it. This realisation explains everything we’re seeing from President Trump. There’s a new American strategy, a completely new American policy. Perhaps the essence of this is that, instead of the Democrats’ characteristic dreaming about global world peace, world democracy and democracy export, the Americans are facing up to the facts. From an American point of view these facts aren’t very cheerful. The first thing they’re facing and have admitted to is that China has an unassailable demographic advantage. China has a growing technological advantage, China has a growing capital advantage, China’s military disadvantage is decreasing. The US economy cannot function without Chinese suppliers, and as time goes by, the Chinese are increasingly becoming creditors to the countries of the Western world. This is the reality.
After China, the next reality facing the Americans is that Russia has won the war. Without the deployment of troops, ground troops, hundreds of thousands of ground troops, Russian victory is irreversible. And the fact is that they don’t want to send troops. They also recognise – and American strategy admits – that while it’s possible to do business with Russia, in the coming decades the Russians cannot be separated from China. The United States must face the fact that it’s losing ground in the Pacific region. 4!-! This is the mystical 200 miles: 200 miles is the distance from your own coastline out to sea within which you have exclusive commercial rights. And at the moment the Chinese are doing nothing but this. All that one hears, and Taiwan is about this too, is they’re developing military capabilities to push out American military forces stationed – or occasionally appearing – within this 200-mile zone. This is the essence of the game, because if the United States loses in the Asia-Pacific region, it will lose globally. America has allies in this region – Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines; but there’s a growing danger that China will slowly but surely integrate these countries into its own economy without military intervention, thereby overtaking the United States there as well.
The third or fourth fact facing the United States’ new policy is that the European Union is weak – and will remain so. These are the facts on which everything we see is based.
Based on these facts, what are the answers given, or which we receive? The first is that America must go home and gather its resources. Everything we see is about this: self-sufficiency in energy; self-sufficiency in raw materials; attracting investors back home – even forcing them home; and tariffs, tariffs, tariffs. Reducing trade deficits, the deficits that are at America’s expense, and collecting even more money. In other words, the United States is dismantling the global economy in which we’ve lived our lives, and regional economic areas are emerging all around the world. Another key element of the American strategy is that the export of democracy is at an end. They don’t want to give sermons anyone. They don’t want to tell anyone what a good political system looks like. Everyone has their own culture, so let them operate as they wish. But they’re returning to great-power politics. Their behaviour is no longer influenced by international rules: they no longer imagine a world with international rules that everyone obeys, but rather a world with actors, powers, forces, influences, capabilities, the ability to project power, the ability to project great power, and the need to use that power. This is what we call great-power politics. This is the position to which the world has returned.
If after all this we look at what’s happening in Europe, I can tell you that turning to 2025 we have questions. We had them last year, in 2025 some of them have already been answered, and in the coming months questions concerning Europe will continue to be answered. The most important question is whether the European economy will recover. We’re going out live, but I’d say that it’s unlikely. In Germany a few days ago the new chancellor declared the end of the welfare state – but no new competitive model has been presented. France is experiencing ongoing government crises, with a vote of confidence – or no confidence – in the Government scheduled for tomorrow. Meanwhile French public debt is approaching 120 per cent of their gross domestic product, and since World War II their debt level has never been as high as it is now. In Poland liberal oppression is coming to an end, and they have a new president who’s creating a rebalancing of power and pursuing his own line of policy. And then there’s the V4, which over the past two to three years has been successfully broken apart by a campaign led by Germany, with the cooperation of Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland has a new president who wants the V4, and in the Czech Republic we see “Babiš ante portas”: it may well be that the Czech Republic’s western adventure is over, and in October they’ll return to their strong Central European economic development programme.
Facing us is the question of the war and its outcome – or rather it’s becoming a series of answers. First of all, we’ve received the answer that the Russian president will remain in office. I’d like to remind everyone that at the beginning of the war an American president named Biden – whom we may still remember – shuffled over to Warsaw. There he gave a speech in which – and for the sake of authenticity I’ll quote him in English – he said “Putin must fail”. He was saying that Putin must fall – not “We’ll defeat him”, or “This is war”, but that he must fall. The Americans openly declared that they wanted to establish a different political regime in Russia. This has led to the situation we’re in now, in which the European Union is financing the war and Russia is also financing the war. There’s a financing competition between the two, in which the Russians are currently winning. This situation is weakening them, but crippling us.
Ukraine is being divided up. The question was, what will become of Ukraine? We discussed that a year ago. Today, looking at developments and understanding what’s happening there with a clear head, we have to say that right now Ukraine is being divided up. Before the war, Ukraine’s situation was very clear: it existed as a buffer state, with 50 per cent influence from the Russians and 50 per cent from the West. There were occasional debates about this, with governments coming and going, but no one questioned the fact that Ukraine was an area located between the West and Russia, a buffer state, and that everyone was safe as long as both the Russians and the West had roughly 50 per cent influence. That was the situation up until the war. The war caused this to fall apart. Exactly how this happened could be the subject of another speech. The point is that this fell apart. Today Europeans talk elegantly about security guarantees – but security guarantees actually mean the division of Ukraine. The first step has already been taken, because the West has accepted that there’s a Russian zone. The only debate is whether, in addition to Crimea, this will comprise two provinces, four provinces, five provinces or six provinces. But there’s no longer any question that it will exist. A Russian zone has already been created, covering approximately 20 per cent of Ukraine. That’s history now, and there’s no longer much debate about it. What’s being debated is how many kilometres a newly created demilitarised zone should extend from the border of the Russian zone: forty kilometres, fifty, one hundred, two hundred? We don’t know, and this is currently being discussed. This will be the second zone. The result of the division of Ukraine will be a Russian zone, a demilitarised zone and, finally, a western zone – the contours and conditions of which we can’t say anything definite about at present; but we can see that Ukraine is being transformed into a territory consisting of three zones.
After this, after talking about the war, let’s talk about what Europe looks like, and what the future of Europe and the European Union will look like. There’s a basic number. If we want to understand where we are now and to locate this in space and historical processes, there’s a basic number that I recommend everyone tries to remember. The year of the financial crisis was 2008 – or 2008–09, as it’s commonly referred to. And when someone looked at the global economy in 2008, they saw that the United States accounted for 22.9 per cent – let’s say 23 per cent – of the world’s total economic output. Meanwhile the European Union accounted for 25.4 percent. So in round figures that’s 23 versus 25. We were 25, the Americans were 23. If we look at the global economy in 2025, we see that the Americans produce 26.8 per cent – let’s say 27 per cent – of the world’s total output, and we Europeans produce 17.6 per cent. This is from 2008 to 2025! This is the historical period, the historical process within which we Europeans are living. From 2008 to 2025 the Americans increased their share of the global economy by 4 per cent, while we lost 8 per cent. This clearly shows that the fact that we’ve found ourselves where we are now is not inevitable – after all, in 2008 we were on a par with the Americans. The fact that we’re not where the Americans are can only be attributed to poor leadership in Europe. If we’d been led as well as the Americans, we’d be where we were before: roughly neck and neck with the Americans. The fact that this isn’t the case is solely due to misguided European policy. These facts form the basis of the argument that I’m about to present to you. I think that the European Union has now entered a state of disintegration and fragmentation. And if this continues, which is the most likely scenario, then the story of the European Union will go down in history as the depressing outcome of a noble experiment. The fact is that the era of the European Union – the period of its existence – will, from a certain historical perspective, be seen as an era of decline and insignificance for the European continent. What was the goal? Because this was clearly not the goal for which we created the European Union. When we created the European Union, we set the following goals. Firstly, that the European Union was to be a force in global politics and economics. Even in 2008 the economic figures justified this. The plan was to create the world’s largest free trade zone. This was described as stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. It would have included Russia, the United Kingdom, Türkiye, the Caucasus and the Balkans. We should have built this, but we failed. What exists instead of this? The United Kingdom has left. The Russians have left, or we’ve pushed them into the arms of the Chinese – how it happened doesn’t matter now, but they’re on China’s side. And the hope that sooner or later there will be a conflict between the Russians and the Chinese is a completely unserious, illusory, mirage-like hope; because if you look at the structure of the Russian and Chinese economies, you’ll see that they’re not competitive, rival economic structures, but complementary, and as easily compatible as is possible. So here the hope is that the Russians and the Chinese will face off against each other, and that this will reopen Europe’s room for manoeuvre; but this is a complete misunderstanding of the structure of the two economies. In any case, we were unable to keep Russia on our side, and we left the Turks in a grey zone, which we don’t need to discuss at length here. Why has the grand European plan failed? Why has Europe failed to become a major force in global politics and economics? There’s a very simple – almost obvious – answer to that question. Thirty years ago the European Union was not yet the European Union, but a common market – just a common market. The idea was to turn that common market into an economic and political union. And the chosen means of creating this economic and political union was the euro, the common currency. Sooner or later, everyone would join the euro, and we’d have a common currency. If we had a common currency, we’d have a common budget. If we had a common currency and a common budget, we’d have a common state: a United States of Europe – an economic and political union. The problem – and the reason for the failure of this experiment – is that there’s a common currency for the countries belonging to the euro and therefore common monetary policy, but there’s no common budgetary policy. And whatever in the world I read, whatever economists I read, there’s complete agreement that it’s not possible to have common monetary policy without common fiscal policy behind it. Everyone who deals with this issue says that it’s only a matter of time before it will creak, crack and break: it cannot remain like that in the long run. It follows, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we’re faced with the task of drawing up the European Union budget for 2028–35, and I’d like to put forward the argument that even if this budget is adopted – which we have serious doubts about – it will be the European Union’s last ever seven-year budget. If things continue like this, then this is the end, my only friend, the end. In a moment I’ll talk about whether it should continue like this. But if it continues like this, then we might be able to put together another budget, although the Ukrainian issue has caused a lot of disruption; but I think it will be completely impossible to put together the following budget after 2035. The result of this will be that the eurozone will break up. This will be a chaotic and costly process.
Is there a way out? What I’m talking about now is a theoretical way out. In politics theory isn’t useless, because in the best-case scenario it serves as a compass or guide for action. So what I’m talking about isn’t whether it’s realistic, but whether – in spite of its current situation – it’s intellectually possible for the European Union to avoid falling apart, and to be able to remain together in some form. And we can give the intellectual answer that yes, that isn’t impossible. But in order for the Union not to fall apart and for this not to be its final budget, the European Union needs to be fundamentally reorganised, because the forces pulling it apart are growing stronger, while the forces holding it together are progressively weakening. This can be reversed through reorganisation, making it in the interest of the majority of Member States to remain in the Union and reducing the number of those who will have an interest in the Union falling apart over the next ten years. This will require a very thorough reorganisation. The European Union must be transformed into a circular structure. This isn’t the same as a multi-speed Europe. A multi-speed Europe means that we’re all sitting in the same car and we have one gearbox, and even though we’re all heading for the same destination we want to travel at different speeds. That’s not what I’m talking about. I’m talking about a circular Europe. In this, the countries located on the outer edge only want to cooperate with one another on two issues and not on any more, but they want to cooperate on those two. One issue is military security, and the other is energy security. Türkiye, the United Kingdom and – horribile dictu – Ukraine can easily be placed in this circle. The second circle, which is tighter than the latter, is the common market. This is a group of countries that want to be in a common market with one another. They want more than military and energy cooperation: they want a common market – as it was, and as it is now. The third circle is the circle of countries that want not only a common market but also a common currency. Those that have a common currency – in the eurozone – will consequently also have a common budget behind them. And then there’s a fourth group of countries that not only want a common market and a common currency, but also want to harmonise their ideas and principles politically: gender, migration, the rule of law, and many other issues on which they want to collectively follow certain political principles. The interpretation of these principles will also be identical, and they can be enforced by the courts. Energy and security, a common market, the eurozone, political union. If we can transition to such a system, then the grand idea of European cooperation – which we call the European Union – can survive the next ten years. If we don’t transition to this system, but continue as before, then my thesis is that we may still be able to create a final budget, but there will be no more after that, and the Union will fall apart, it will disintegrate.
Why hasn’t Hungary collapsed, while the European economy clearly has? This question is also worth considering. Our answer is that Hungary hasn’t collapsed because in 2010 – when we won the election with a two-thirds majority – the 2008 financial crisis was only two years old; and so two years after the crisis, in 2010, we broke away from the European economic model. The European economic model, which calls itself a welfare state, is in fact a welfare benefits-based economy. In 2010 we broke away from this and built a different economy, which can be called a work-based economy or a work-based state. At first glance there seems to be no difference between the Hungarian economy and a Western European economy; but when I look at the underlying structures, there are fundamental differences. It’s as if we’re in two different worlds. I’ll now list the ways in which we differ from other European Union countries at the level of underlying structures. First, there’s labour market regulation. We have the most flexible and market-friendly labour market regulations. They’re based on a logic that’s completely different from that in the West. They’re based on the principle that anyone who wants to work should be able to work. The second factor is the unemployment benefit system. The Hungarian unemployment benefit system is completely different from that of Western Europe. This isn’t only because it covers three months, while over there it covers nine, twelve or eighteen months, but because when it’s over, there’s no more: at the end there’s public work. This is unthinkable in Western Europe. Our tax system is radically different from that of the West, and this is where the current debate on tax systems leads us back to. We have a flat tax system. Nowhere else! Everywhere else has a progressive system. Our family support system. We call it family support, as do Westerners, but these are two different things. This is because they provide it on the assumption that it’s a right. Due to the structural characteristics of Hungarian society, we, on the other hand, provide a significant part of family support in connection with work. Those who work receive more family support. The same applies to inheritance. In Hungary there’s no inheritance tax, whereas almost everywhere else there is. This is because, according to the Hungarian way of thinking, what you have isn’t just yours, but your family’s. Everyone has contributed to it through their work: your grandparents, your parents, you, everyone. They’ve already paid tax on it once, so why should they pay again? After all, it belongs to the family. This is unthinkable in Western Europe. Transaction tax. The transaction tax is one of [György] Matolcsy’s innovations, which one or two countries are now trying to adopt; but it was philosophically unthinkable, because quite simply it’s a sales tax – or VAT – on money. We have this, and indeed we think it’s right for money to be subject to VAT. Sectoral taxes. They’re emerging in the West, but they’re not a substantial part of the economic system. In our country taxes on certain sectors are an essential element of the tax system. An energy system based on reductions in household energy bills. Well, it’s only found here! Perhaps the Bulgarians are trying something similar, but in Western Europe there’s no energy policy that prioritises reducing utility bills and household costs. Everywhere over there, what comes first is profit and return on investment. Outward investment support. There’s hardly a country in Europe that gives money to its entrepreneurs to invest abroad in regions that are important to that country. Here we have such a system in place. Home creation. In most Western European countries the focus is on providing fast, affordable rental housing. Currently this debate is happening here as well. One’s own home. Hungarians feel secure when they have a roof over their heads, when they have their own home. And something we’re doing now is the final element that will completely separate us from the Western European economy: the existential security of women, their independence. If you’ve given birth to two children, you won’t pay personal income tax for the rest of your life. This provides enormous security, which is unmatched anywhere else in Western Europe. I just want to tell you that these differences aren’t superficial: they’re fundamental, deep-seated differences. And while after the financial crisis others collapsed and their economic performance declined, Hungary didn’t collapse, but actually increased its economic performance. This is because after 2010, as a result of two to three years of hard work, we created a deep structural transformation: a Hungarian economic model that is completely different from the Western model. As can be clearly seen from the election results, this is acceptable for the people and supported by them. I could describe the Hungarian economic system as one in which prosperity is spread as much as possible. This is what the Hungarian economic system is like.
What is the EU trying to do now? The EU isn’t trying to do what we’re proposing to them, which is to reorganise the European Union into four concentric circles. The European Union is currently working to try to save the European Union in its currently existing form. We’re seeing what I believe to be a last-ditch attempt. This is called collective debt. Before the EU falls apart, they want to drag everyone into massive collective debt – because from that point on there will be no escape. From that point on, collective debt will create a single state. This is how the United States was created. I advise everyone to study this if they feel like it, because originally the United States didn’t exist: when the English settlers went there independent states were created. In what’s known as the “Hamilton moment”, the United States was created when the then Secretary of the Treasury got the states to accept collective debt. It was after this that the United States of America came into existence. Here and now the plan is exactly the same. And they also believe that the best tool for attaining collective debt is Ukraine. What we must perceive is only the war, not only geopolitics, but also the future of the Union. The leaders of the European Union believe that collective debt is a goal that can be sold to everyone, at least in Western Europe, and that the most saleable reason for taking on enormous debt is the war in Ukraine, or security. Citing this, they want to create massive debt for all of us. In our opinion – in the opinion of Hungarians, and certainly in my opinion – this is a mistake. Ukraine’s membership of the European Union is necessarily concomitant with this collective debt, because if we let the Ukrainians in, we won’t have the money to bring the Ukrainians up to the EU average, and so we’ll have to take out loans. So they think that Ukrainian membership – the war and Ukrainian membership – will create collective debt; but in fact Ukrainian membership will drag the European Union into war. Because if one of the Member States of the European Union is attacked from outside or gets involved in a border conflict, as is currently the case on the Russian–Ukrainian border, we can’t imagine that in such a situation the other EU Member States wouldn’t rush to the aid of the one that’s under military attack. The fact is that the question of whether Ukraine is under military attack – whether Ukraine is in conflict with Russia – will never be decided by Ukraine, but always by Russia. And we’ll immediately be at war. So I think Europeans are wrong; Ukraine’s membership of the European Union will drag us into war – directly or indirectly, either way. What’s more, they don’t even have the money. I’ve just mentioned the figures showing how the EU’s performance has declined. We don’t even have enough money to restore our own competitiveness, but we want to send the money that we do have to Ukraine – thereby destroying the European Union in economic terms as well. This is the plan: collective debt – with, in my opinion, poorly calculated consequences.
What does this mean for the next year or two? Firstly, the European Union will remain a minor player in global politics. As has been announced, Germany – the most important Member State of the European Union – is attempting to bring about the end of the welfare state; but this is resulting in constant government crises, and even threatening the very essence of democracy – namely the transfer of power. I’d like to draw everyone’s attention to the fact that the inability of political systems and democracies to manage historical challenges is leading to a situation in which rivals who could win the elections aren’t being allowed to run. Le Pen isn’t allowed to run in the election, even though there’s no final court ruling against her. There’s a ruling in the first instance that says that she committed some kind of party financing offence. Of course this can be appealed in the second instance, and there will be a ruling on it; but as an additional penalty Le Pen has been banned from running in the election, and this takes effect immediately – without waiting for the verdict in the second instance. Similarly, Le Pen’s second-in-command is already facing legal proceedings, because there may be elections in France this year. Or look at Germany, where the AfD, currently the most popular party, is simply classified as dangerous and not allowed to run in elections. Right now they’re not allowed to run in a mayoral election. So what we’re talking about isn’t simply an economic problem and the end of the welfare state, but we have to face a real democratic problem. So the situation is that the European Union remains a minor player in world politics, trying to orchestrate the end of the welfare state within a democratic framework – and it’s very doubtful whether it will be able to do so. Meanwhile the development of mixed societies is at an advanced stage, with the result that the concept of a uniform European legal system has come to an end. We’re accustomed to the concept of one country, one legal system. This will come to an end in Western Europe within days. This is because there’s a community based on Christian traditions, which will have its own legal system; and there will be another based on Islam, which will also have its own legal system. There are Western European countries where, according to the law, only the marriage of one man and one woman – or more precisely, one person to one other person – is recognized, but where it’s already possible to go in and say that you’re married, but also in a domestic relationship with another person, and the state will also register that. This is a clear sign that Islamisation will lead to the disintegration of the uniform European legal system. What does this mean for parallel societies? It means parallel legal systems. Meanwhile, Islamisation and the influx of migrants continue to advance, and as a result public order will disintegrate. We can see this happening every day. This is what the European Union will have to face in the coming years.
I don’t want to dampen our spirits, but now I’ll describe the alternative scenario: how things could have been different, how there was a missed opportunity, and what steps the leaders of the EU could have taken to prevent us from being where we are today. I’ll list them. To have truly created a large market from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which would have meant reaching an agreement with the Russians on economic issues. To have begun reorganising the welfare state during the major European financial crisis of 2008–09. The United Kingdom should have been kept in. A strategic partnership should have been established with Türkiye. Islam should have been kept out of Europe, and the Balkans should have been integrated. Agreements could have been reached with China on technological cooperation, and with the US on transatlantic security. This is the situation. All of this was possible. It didn’t happen because Europe didn’t have leaders who could make it happen. Why didn’t they? Because every step like this has a precondition: you have to be stable at home. If – unlike us, and our party alliance with the KDNP [Christian Democratic People’s Party] – you’re not stable at home, but have a fragile coalition government, then even if you see what needs to be done in European politics you can’t actually do it. You can’t do it on the European stage unless you have a secure political background at home, similar to that in Hungary. This is the lesson of the past twenty years.
If you’ll allow me, I’d like to say a few words about the war. There’s so much confusion that it’s difficult to understand who’s doing what and who wants what. In this regard I’d like to offer some help. Who wants what? In order to understand and identify this, we need to choose a suitable vantage point, a high place from which we can see the whole terrain clearly. What is the key to understanding the war? This is my interpretation. Rival interpretations are possible, and I’m sure there are some. In my opinion, the key to understanding the war is that the dream of a global market is a thing of the past, it won’t return, and there will be competing blocs and competing markets. As I’ve said, we’ll see the return of great-power politics. The leaders of the European Union believe that if they strengthen the institutions of the European Union, through them the European Union will be able to play a great-power role. But this isn’t true. It’s erroneous, and it will go hand in hand with ruthless centralisation. Let’s look at who has what goals. Russia’s goal is to limit Western expansion. China’s goal is to transform the US-dominated world order into a multipolar one, and to gain privileged access to Russia’s economic system. Ukraine’s goal is to ensure that financial aid continues to flow into the country and to avoid economic collapse – because without the financial aid it’s received due to the war, the Ukrainian economy would effectively go bankrupt overnight. What is Europe’s goal? To maintain Ukraine’s war capabilities and keep the US involved in the conflict. What’s the goal of the United States? This is changing now: as I’ve said, Biden’s goals were different from those of Trump. I think President Trump’s goal is to reach an agreement with the Russians on economic issues and to subordinate the European Union economically to the United States. As long as the war continues, the European Union will be a lame duck. The European Union can’t make a move while this war continues, because it’s dependent on the United States for its defence. Without the United States it can’t settle Ukraine – let alone maintain its own security. And if you’re vulnerable in terms of security, you can’t pursue autonomous trade policy either. We saw this during the tariff negotiations. Europe’s vulnerability in terms of defence can’t be eliminated while the war in Ukraine continues. Europe shouldn’t be knocking on Washington’s door, but it should go to Moscow and conclude a security agreement between the European Union and Russia. This would not only be on Ukraine, but it would be an EU–Russia security agreement that would clearly state that Ukraine won’t become a member of either NATO or the European Union. And it could include – and I think Hungary could support this – a strategic cooperation agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. We don’t want to push the Ukrainians into oblivion, we’re not anti-Ukrainian. We think of our history and our minorities, and we don’t have many reasons to throw our hats in the air, but we’re not anti-Ukrainian: we want Ukraine to have a future and prospects, because a collapsing Ukraine neighbouring us to the east would be a huge danger. But this future cannot be membership [of the EU], because that would mean war. A strategic cooperation agreement, however, could certainly be possible. And the European Union cannot open up to China and India as long as the war continues, because the war is the point of reference. Accusing China and India of buying Russian energy and thereby financing the war precludes us from concluding economic cooperation agreements with those countries. In short, what I’m saying is that for Europe continuing the war is a losing strategy. The United States has only one thing to do, and that’s what it’s doing: it asks for a coffee, and the boss listens to the European subordinates. This is what’s happening, and if we don’t change, this is how it will remain. So much for the world.
Up until now we’ve been on high beam, but let’s switch to low-beam headlights. What’s happening in Hungary? From a suitable perspective, I see that what’s happening before our eyes is none other than the crystallisation of a political formula that up to now has been rather confused. It’s obvious that in strategic terms Hungary has only two options, and we need to choose between them. Both are viable options. Each has contours, a clear substance, tangible reality, and one of them can be chosen. The first is to align with the policy of Brussels. In my opinion this would be disastrous, and would lead to chaos and poverty. We’d simply be hitching Hungary’s wagon to the European Union train. Today this alternative, this intellectual political strategy, is being represented in the political sphere. Today there’s a proposal, a suggestion, that Hungary should do this. This is what the DK [Democratic Coalition] has been saying for a long time, and this is what the Tisza Party is also saying. The other option is for Hungary to stick to the model that we’ve built up over the past decade and more. If we hitch our wagon to the European Union train, which I believe is heading for the precipice, it will mean – as Tisza and DK also say – that the welfare benefits-based economy will be restored, Brussels’ economic demands will have to be accepted, we’ll have to join the eurozone and Hungarian state sovereignty will be toast. We’ll have to abandon reductions in household energy bills, we’ll have to rethink the thirteenth month’s pension, we’ll have to introduce multi-rate income tax as demanded by them, and we’ll have to disconnect from Russian energy. Reductions in household energy bills will be a thing of the past, and family support will also have to be transformed from what it is now into a system of universal entitlements. We’ll have to accept Brussels’ war demands, give money to Ukraine, send soldiers to Ukraine, and allow Ukraine to join the European Union. If we choose this path, this is what will happen. We’ll also have to accept Brussels’ green policy – which we oppose. We’ll have to accept the migration pact on the distribution of migrants, and we’ll also have to accept the EU’s economic policies. All in all, this would mean a collective war, collective debt, collective economic policy and a collective currency. This is one option on offer. We have that choice.
I’d like to quietly point out that it won’t simply be a matter of us deciding: the European Public Prosecutor’s Office will also have a say in this matter. I’d like to draw everyone’s attention to the current state of parliamentary immunity in Brussels. Today the leader of pro-Brussels policy is being shielded by immunity from Brussels. Immunity! It’s unprecedented for a person who’s facing criminal charges or is under criminal investigation in Hungary not to have their immunity waived. And if it’s waived, then he’ll have to face the legal system in Hungary: for insider trading and theft. The only thing saving the opposition leader from this happening today is European parliamentary immunity. This is the situation. No one cares whether it’s fair or not, whether it’s in line with the rule of law or not. This is how they get a hold over people. And now I see that there’s a new economic factotum – a banker who’s on the payroll of a foreign bank, because he works for Erste. This is the offer made to the leading economic policymaker. They have a hold over one of them through immunity, while the other is being paid by Western bankers. This is the situation. You can choose the European route, but don’t imagine that we have an independent choice – because once we’ve chosen it, we won’t be able to get off. This is also what the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is about. So if someone can do this with parliamentary immunity, what will they be able to do in Hungary with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office? Well, the same thing! It doesn’t take much imagination. The other option is to stick to our own Hungarian programme and model, which is what Fidesz and KDNP propose. This is the following: a work-based state; a common market, but with national economic policy; staying out of the war; staying out of collective debt; no EU membership for Ukraine, but only a strategic partnership; national energy policy; rejection of migration; no mixed society. But there will be child protection, we’ll reorganise the V4, and we’ll cultivate special relationships with the US, China and Russia. In other words, I can summarise this as peace, a common market, our own economic policy, our own money, and independence. This is the political structure of the 2026 election.
I’ll be on my way home soon, Anikó, but I need to say a few words about today’s situation. First of all, the starting point for today’s situation is that we’re the favourites. In Hungary, there’s a strange concept linked to being the favourite, which can be observed especially in sport. It’s called the burden of being the favourite. This is a Hungarian invention. For normal people, the burden isn’t felt by the favourites, but by the underdogs, isn’t it? It’s much worse to be the underdog than to be the favourite. And we need to understand this too: we’re the favourites. We’re in the lead. There are debates about all kinds of polls. Our own analysis says that if the election was held today, we’d win 80 of the 106 constituencies, which would result in a stable government. We have our candidates; we have a strong organisation that’s non-digital and based on a real human community; we have growing digital capabilities, and in this we’ll be in the lead in October, although we’re not there yet; and we have targeted economic programmes. On the latter we’ve had to reschedule, because earlier we thought that we’d be able to launch our targeted economic programmes in early 2025. We’d expected that the US president would end the war within a month or two. The war is blocking economic growth – and if the war weren’t blocking economic growth, there would be growth of 3 or 4 per cent instead of 1 per cent, and we’d have been able to launch the targeted programmes in January. But since the American president was unable to bring about peace, and sanctions and the war are blocking the economy, economic growth didn’t reach the level that we’d have liked, and so we had to postpone all our targeted programmes by six months. Quite simply, we couldn’t take the risk of launching them in the uncertain situation that prevailed in January and February. This is why all our targeted economic programmes have been launched six months later. But they’ve been launched. We’ll see whether this turns out to be fortunate or unfortunate.
What are our targeted economic programmes? We’ve made infant support benefit [CSED] and childcare allowance [GYED] tax-free from 1 July: forty to sixty thousand forints per month. We’ve increased the tax credit for families with children by 50 per cent from 1 July. On 1 September we launched the home creation programme featuring loans with 3 per cent interest. We’ll be sending pensioners vouchers in October, or even starting now, to compensate for the high VAT – shopping vouchers, essentially. From October mothers with three children will be tax-exempt for life. In November we’ll be paying out pension supplements. In January we’ll be paying out the next six-month armed services allowance. On 1 January we’ll be increasing the tax credit for families with children by another 50 per cent. From 1 January, mothers under the age of 40 with at least two children will be exempt from tax for life. We can defend the planned 13 per cent increase in the minimum wage, and we’ll go above that in the social and cultural sectors. And at the beginning of February we’ll be paying out the thirteenth month’s pension. So my vision for the seven months ahead is that we’ll fulfil every single one of our commitments and promises – admittedly with a six-month delay, after six months of rescheduling. But all of them. And it will be clear – just as I said at the start: what we say happens, and what we promise, we always make good on.
What’s the essence of the victory plan? It sounds so good, as if it were already a done deal, doesn’t it? But that’s not the case. An election cannot be won by a good programme alone. Neither can an election be won by keeping promises alone. There are older fighters here who remember the smell of gunpowder back in 2002: we kept all our promises; we didn’t govern badly; we were trustworthy. But because we didn’t do our job as we should have done, we didn’t win the election. So the path is marked out – but we must follow it. Opportunity doesn’t come automatically: we need to make the opportunity count, and there’s work to be done. And the tasks must be completed. Everything must be done exactly as we’ve planned. This is what the victory plan is all about. Our presidency has appointed Balázs Orbán to bear responsibility for its implementation. Digital construction must be accelerated: all hands on deck! It doesn’t matter whether or not you’re considered a pessimist in cultural-anthropological terms, or whether or not you’re a technophobe – every patriotic person must get up on deck and participate in online life.
I’ll digress here for a moment. We can’t make the internet, Facebook or smartphones disappear – they’re here to stay. If we don’t adapt, we’ll lose. We may not like the direction the world is going in, but that’s the way it is. We have to adapt in a way that allows us to seize the greatest opportunities while doing so. That’s the only option open to us. We couldn’t undo the invention of the airplane or the combustion engine. I could talk about dislike for the online space, and we all know its undesirable features; but no matter how great our dislike for it, if we don’t go there – if we don’t understand that today politics happens there, that debates happen there, that relationships happen there, that conversations happen there – our opponents will go there, and we won’t be able to win. So we must continue building our online presence. All hands on deck! The peace march, indeed peace marches, with the broadest possible unity. Policy debates, proving our ability to govern and winning the contest to prove fitness for government. Mobilisation over the next seven months. We’ll soon be launching a national consultation on the leaked tax increase plans, which is also part of this mobilisation. Everything must be subordinated to our shared victory. All I can say is that from now on everyone really needs to do everything they can. Those who know me know that I don’t threaten or act aggressively – but believe me, nothing will be forgotten. Everything will be noted, and everything will be dealt with.
And there’s one thought we must keep in mind over the next seven months – one important thought. Hungary is a country of ten million people. Our homeland is a country without natural resources. Our homeland is located in the heart of an unstable region. Our homeland is a country that needs special leadership skills. If we have a foolish government, we’ll be ruined. Everyone must keep this in mind over the coming months. After victory, we’ll strengthen the V4, double the number of Patriots for Europe in Brussels, take Brussels – and I’ll give an exciting speech on this in the autumn of 2026.
Thank you for your kind attention.