Good morning.
As we’re in Tusnádfürdő/Băile Tuşnad, let’s start with the fact that the Bálványos Free University generally goes beyond national politics and also addresses strategic issues. Here last year, for example, you outlined the foundations of Hungary’s grand strategy. What’s the significance of this event in terms of determining the future direction of Hungary and the region?
Interpreting your question at a spiritual level, then the Tusnádfürdő Summer University represents liberation: the liberation of Hungarian politics. An extremely important aspect of politics is perspective: the time frame you refer to when you say what you say, when you analyse what you analyse, when you deal with what you deal with. And politics is a world that deals with day-to-day affairs, so it locks you in: in the morning you have to start work and deal with a certain number of issues, make decisions and implement them; so you’re locked into the world of day-to-day affairs. So it’s a tremendous experience for us – and perhaps also for non-politicians who are interested in politics – when people involved in public life sometimes break free from this narrow perspective and step into a broader space. In other words, when we talk about what will happen tomorrow, what will happen in 2030, 2040 or 2050, what we’re doing, what the deeper or higher meaning of it is, and what the prospects are. Suddenly the whole thing is imbued with an intellectual sparkle, an energy, an excitement, and suddenly it somehow frees us. This is why everyone likes to come to Tusnádfürdő/Băile Tuşnad. This shouldn’t be seen as a free university in the sense that everyone does what they want – which is of course true, because there are concerts, culture and politics; but it should also be considered in terms of perspective, in terms of opening up a perspective for us outside our daily constraints, and freeing us. This is why everyone always comes here – and I personally have been here thirty-something times, or God knows how many.
Looking at this broader perspective, what can we say in comparison with last year? Last year you outlined a grand strategy with a horizon of roughly 2050. How has this changed compared to last year?
Last year I employed a trick. I said that there was a Hungarian grand strategy, I hinted at a few things, and then I said that it wasn’t yet ready for me to present the details. Tomorrow I’ll go one step further, as now I’m able to present some of the more important elements of the Hungarian grand strategy.
Since you’ve mentioned perspective, Tusnádfürdő/Băile Tuşnad always provides a perspective in terms of policy on Hungarian communities beyond the borders. From this point of view, the key issue is the question of communities remaining in the territories beyond the borders and their ability to maintain the closest possible relations with the mother country. From this perspective, how do you assess the past few years, and what can the Government do to make these relations as close as possible?
In Hungarian politics there’s an important saying that goes thus: the state has borders, but the nation does not. There are countries for which this saying means nothing, because for them the borders of the nation and the state coincide – but our history is different. We lost territories, things were taken from us, and as a result one third of the Hungarian population remained outside our borders – which is why for us the borders of the state and the nation don’t coincide. And, naturally, Hungarian politics in the sense of public law deals with the affairs of people living within the state borders, at home in Hungary. But above this, there’s also a national horizon, and the situation here in Tusnádfürdő/Băile Tuşnad always reminds us that when you’re Hungarian and you think about the future, you think about yourself, but then you mustn’t only concern yourself with Hungarians in Hungary, but you must also include Hungarians living beyond the borders. This is what we call thinking in terms of the nation. Thinking in terms of the nation sounds funny, because what are we supposed to think about? A writer once said that he thinks in terms of subjects and predicates, so we can joke about it, but there is meaning in the phrase “thinking in terms of the nation”; this is because it means that we view the fate of the Hungarian people in a larger context than the perspectives and interests of Hungarians living within state borders that were drawn against our will. And we’re reminded of this by this gathering, because it’s the largest political gathering involving the world of Hungarians beyond the borders. It’s a great achievement too, if I may say so – and that’s something that’s not even disputed. I remember in 1990, when we were starting out with democracy in Hungary, a major subject of debate was still the question of “Little Hungary” or “Greater Hungary”. This was about the whole idea of historical Hungary. I don’t like the term “Greater Hungary”, because others use the word “greater” to refer to countries that never existed in a particular form, and so it’s more an expression of desire. That isn’t the case with Hungary. I use the term “historical Hungary”, because there’s no room for debate about it. It’s not an idea or a plan, but a fact that’s already been recognised, and we refer to it when we talk about the nation. So I remember that during the infancy of our democracy there were huge debates about whether or not everyone should think in terms of the nation. There were parties that were unwilling to do so – mainly left-wing parties, and especially the SZDSZ. But they either faded away or changed their position, so that today there’s a political consensus in Hungary – and the Constitution also states that the Hungarian government must take responsibility for Hungarians living beyond the borders.
How does this manifest itself in practice, looking at the past few years? And what are the plans for the coming period?
We’ve introduced the institution of dual citizenship. This is one of the national government’s historic achievements. Then we launched economic development programmes. Now we’re here in Transylvania, and trade between Romania and Hungary exceeds 13 billion euros – which is perhaps our third largest. So for us this is also an extremely important economic relationship. When we implement economic development programmes in areas beyond the borders, we’re essentially expanding the opportunities for Hungarian trade. Then there are the educational and cultural institutions: at any given moment, some 230,000 young people across the Carpathian Basin are learning Hungarian. We’ve built and renovated hundreds of kindergartens and nurseries. For us it’s important for Hungarian children to be able to study in Hungarian-language institutions, to learn Hungarian, and to understand the world in Hungarian. Then there’s the practical consequence of thinking in terms of the nation: our extension of our motorways to the country’s borders, which is another way of connecting us with the Hungarian communities living there. We currently have two such links with Transylvania, but the link in the direction of Szatmárnémeti/Satu Mare will soon be complete. And then we’ll go south and open up Békés County from Nagyszalonta/Salonta. So what I’m saying is that national thinking is present in almost all areas of policy – including transport, culture, tax policy, citizenship and education.
And for this to be successful, it’s helpful if bilateral relations are also good with those countries where Hungarian minorities live. Before arriving in Tusnádfürdő/Băile Tuşnad, you met with the Romanian prime minister in Bucharest. How forward-looking was this meeting from this point of view?
We’re starting from a good position, as Hungarian diplomacy achieved a fantastic feat last year by removing the physical border between Hungary and Romania. I believe that the Romanians were unfairly and unjustly restricted and kept outside the so-called Schengen Area, within which there’s free movement. During the Hungarian Presidency we managed to change this, and bring Romania into the Schengen Area. Given the historical background and the relationship between the two countries, we were probably the last people the Romanians expected to help them in this matter, but the opposite happened: we were the ones who, in close cooperation with them, successfully resolved the issue. Therefore yesterday’s meeting with the new Romanian prime minister started from a good position, as we have a joint success behind us. We’re talking about a new prime minister, who’s my twenty-somethingth counterpart there, the 23rd or 24th: the standard of Romanian government stability isn’t the same here as in Hungary – it’s a different world here. Here it’s the President who stabilises the system, because the President is directly elected – so let’s not be completely unfair to the Romanians. There’s a stabilising element in this system, namely the President of the Republic; but prime ministers change frequently, so it’s always important to know who’s on the other side. Now they’ve brought in a man from Nagyvárad/Oradea as Prime Minister. He spoke Romanian, I spoke Hungarian, but culturally we were on the same wavelength. He used to live a few kilometres from the Hungarian border, and for a long time he was mayor of that city. He’s a heavyweight. So, in short, I can say that he’s a serious man, a heavyweight, with clear ideas. The situation in Romania is very difficult. It’s not my place to judge, but there are serious economic challenges to be faced here, and dealing with them requires a great deal of expertise. I’ve seen this before: it’s similar to the situation in Hungary at the end of the Gyurcsány regime, which we saw in 2009–10–11. It’s manageable, because we were able to manage it, but one has to get one’s act together. I met a determined prime minister who’s experienced, and with him Romania has a good chance of overcoming its problems.
Let’s also look at relations with another neighbouring country: Ukraine. If we turn to the issue of war and Ukraine, last year you arrived here after the peace mission, and said that we were slowly but surely moving away from pro-war European politics towards pro-peace politics. By contrast, now we see that, after some hesitation, support for Ukraine is intensifying again, and Brussels is pushing much harder for EU accession than it was doing last year. What would it take to on the one hand be able to speak optimistically about peace, and on the other hand for issues related to EU membership to take a different direction?
Since you’ve mentioned the situation a year ago, at that time I was indeed in Kyiv/Kiev and had the opportunity to talk to President Zelenskyy. I tried to help him, and encouraged him to understand that they’d lost this war – or would lose it in a matter of moments. I told him that time wasn’t on their side, no one has ever defeated a nuclear superpower, and that I thought Ukraine would be wise to move towards a ceasefire and peace. Back then they rejected this, and the President also rejected my offer. I said that I’d be happy to mediate, and – as I was going to Moscow and Beijing, and would be talking to the future US president – I’d be happy to be a useful instrument for peace, if he thought so too. But he didn’t think so. He said that time was on the Ukrainians’ side, that they’d win this war, that it was only a matter of time, and that we’d see whether or not America would turn towards peace, but it was impossible to be sure. I think this was a tragic decision on his part, and a heavy price will be paid for it – by the Ukrainians, not us Hungarians. A year ago it would have been possible to negotiate a ceasefire – or even peace – with the Russians under much more favourable circumstances, but now they’re in a much worse position. He misjudged the situation. The claim that time is on Ukraine’s side wasn’t true a year ago, and it isn’t true now. But that’s their business. We did what we could, we made an offer, we offered our cooperation, and from that point on everyone was the architect of their own fortune. Since then, one thing in Ukrainian–Hungarian relations can be considered significant: Brussels is pushing for Ukraine’s membership of the European Union. Hungary is Ukraine’s neighbour. If we lived on the Atlantic coast, we could say that if you in the eastern reaches think that it’s good for you, then let’s talk about Ukraine’s membership of the European Union. But we don’t live on the Atlantic coast, nor even in the safe inner European, German territories, but here on the eastern edge of Europe, neighbouring the Ukrainians. And the fact is that Ukrainian membership is unacceptable to us, because if we accept Ukraine we accept war, and we’ll become the theatre of war: this region of the world will become the theatre of war. Admitting a country at war into the European Union would mean that we’d declared war, that there will be war in Europe; and the geographical region hit hardest by this would be the region neighbouring Ukraine, which would be the warring, prospective – or actual – EU Member State. This is unacceptable. Countless Hungarians would die, our young people would be taken from us, we’d become embroiled in a war, we’d suffer terrible destruction, and our economy would be reduced to ruins – just as is the case in war. It’s therefore in Hungary’s fundamental interest to maintain its position of rejecting Ukraine’s EU membership and to make it clear to the West that there’s no point in putting pressure on Hungary, because for Hungary this issue isn’t tactical, but existential. We’ll never support a foreign policy line that threatens Hungary’s destruction, because we are Hungarians.
At the same time, Zelenskyy says that this harms Ukraine’s interests, and this week he stated that anyone who harms Ukraine’s interests will have to face the consequences. Meanwhile, following the burning of a church in Palágykomoróc/Palagy Komarivci, anti-Hungarian graffiti has appeared in several places in Transcarpathia. What measures or steps from Hungary do these events justify?
I wonder whether the statement you quoted from the President is true – namely that Hungary’s position is harmful to Ukraine’s interests. It may be. At the same time, Hungary isn’t just saying “no”. We have an offer for the Ukrainians, because we don’t consider them to be enemies. They may consider us their enemies, but we don’t consider them our enemies. And we believe that there should be orderly cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union: reasonable and well-organised cooperation that doesn’t pose a risk of war for the Union. So there can be no question of membership, because that would be irrevocable. There’s no such thing as expulsion: once we accept you in, we can’t kick you out the next day. Once we’ve accepted you in, we’ve accepted a share in your fate. And today Ukraine’s fate is to be a buffer state bordering Russia. We don’t want to accept this fate, as Hungarians have just escaped from it: we used to be a buffer state during the Cold War. We weren’t part of the Soviet Union, but we were located on the western edge of the Soviet Union and on the eastern edge of the Western world: we were a buffer state. We understand this, we know what it’s like, and we don’t want to return to that position. Ukraine is in this situation. This may not be comfortable or desirable, and they may want to break out of it, but the nature of history is that a country’s house number cannot be changed – especially not at the expense of its neighbour. So we have a proposal not for membership but for strategic cooperation, based on a treaty that can be maintained, terminated or amended as the situation requires. In this we’d be partners. But that’s not what’s being discussed now; instead, a membership plan is being forced upon us. And there’s no doubt that threats are being made: Ukraine is making very serious threats against Hungary. I’m trying to deal with this calmly, with strategic composure. There can be no place here for hot-headedness: this isn’t a theatrical stage, even though President Zelenskyy comes from the stage. This requires composure and experience. And this is why I ignore it when necessary, I take it seriously when necessary, and I order countermeasures from the secret services and law enforcement agencies when necessary. So we make the appropriate response – even when we don’t make a big deal out of it. The truth, however, is that the Ukrainians are becoming increasingly involved in Hungarian politics. There are already pro-Ukrainian parties, such as Tisza and DK [Democratic Coalition], and they’re supported by Brussels and Ukraine. They’ve infiltrated the media in a clearly identifiable way. We know the journalists and forums that explicitly represent the Ukrainian position in Hungary on behalf of their clients. They’ve also infiltrated the world of experts. We see opinions, so-called expert opinions, claiming that Hungarians – Hungarians from Hungary – set fire to the church in Transcarpathia in order to provoke conflict. This is nonsense, and obviously no one would say such nonsense on their own initiative: interests lie behind it. So we need to defend ourselves, because Ukraine is entering, infiltrating – not publicly, but in the secret, dark, grey zone, increasingly infiltrating Hungary’s body or Hungarian public life. We must defend ourselves against this. We shall always take appropriate countermeasures, and we shall not hesitate. So they know us, and they know that we shall defend our national interests, tooth and nail.
Support for Ukraine also features prominently in the Commission’s next seven-year budget plan. Last week you said that roughly 20–25 percent of this budget would go to Ukraine under various headings. How much is this, if we compare it to Hungary’s gross domestic product, for example, or if we look at it from the perspective of how much it would cost Hungarian taxpayers and Hungarian families?
I’ve had all kinds of calculations done. It’s difficult to convey this accurately, but perhaps what we can all understand is that the money they want to give to Ukraine is eighteen times the total amount of pensions paid in Hungary in a given year. This is how much we’d have to give – or rather this is how much Ukraine would have to receive from the European Union, with part of it having to come from us. We estimate that Ukraine would receive around 360–370 billion euros over seven years, while Hungary’s total national economic output in one year is around 200 billion euros. By Hungarian standards we’re talking about huge sums.
Meanwhile, farmers across Europe feel that in this budget they’re the biggest losers. And Hungary shares the position of the farmers, who feel that it’s as if their money is being given to Ukraine. What’s the reason behind this? What’s the reason for cutting agricultural subsidies by the largest amount?
It’s difficult to say who the biggest losers are. In theory, everyone in Europe is a loser, because we’re all wasting money in Ukraine – except for the large European international companies, the multinationals. The latter are already there in Ukraine, and will scoop up most of the money we send there and take it home – just as they did when we joined the European Union. So there are a few large European international – and, of course, American – companies that would make a huge profit if this money were to arrive in Ukraine. But the people of Europe, including Hungarians, would all lose out. Agriculture and farmers are indeed high on the list of losers, because the plan is to take a lot of money from them and divert it to Ukraine. In addition, they’d also lose market share, because agricultural production conditions in Ukraine are completely different from those here, where it’s much more expensive, because our farmers have to comply with all kinds of regulations. It wouldn’t be fair competition if crops could be imported to the European market from there, where they can be produced more cheaply, while we’re forced to produce at a higher cost. So our farmers must be protected. I find it outrageous that the Tisza Party’s experts refer to European – or rather Hungarian – farmers as trained monkeys or chimpanzees, because they’ve adapted their farming practices to an existing support system. Well, what should they have done? You can’t talk about people like that – and besides, the diagnosis is wrong.
They’d make things stricter, anyway...
Although I’d add that, from my perspective, since the Left’s previous prime ministerial candidate described those on the Right as mushrooms being fed with manure, and now they’re talking about chimpanzees, then that’s still a kind of developmental path. You can look at it from that perspective too.
The rule of law conditions would also be tightened. For example, agricultural subsidies would also be tied to this, on the grounds that rule of law conditions are necessary for the efficient spending of resources. What do you think is the connection between efficiency and the rule of law?
The rule of law instrument is a political cudgel: it has nothing to do with the rule of law. In Europe at the moment the biggest violators of the rule of law are the Commission itself and Brussels. So this is the most brazen thing I’ve ever seen: for any Member State to be criticised on the grounds of the rule of law by an imperial centre that is itself trampling on the rule of law. This whole thing is a system of political blackmail. We must scrap it all together.
Let’s talk about another issue. Yesterday the Government introduced a ban to prevent an Irish band known for its anti-Semitism and support of terrorists from performing at the Sziget Festival in Hungary. I won’t quote the band’s reaction here, because it’s too extreme for this programme...
But we can use our imaginations, yes.
...but the festival organisers also said that while they condemn hate speech, they guarantee the “fundamental right of artistic expression” for all performers. In recent days what constitutes artistic expression and what doesn’t has been the subject of much debate, but it seems that the Government and the festival are thinking about this issue on different wavelengths. What’s this debate about, and what do you think is the most important thing to look at here?
First of all, it’s important to control your emotions. So I respect people working in Hungarian show business, concert and festival organisers – including Sziget. I think it’s a difficult job, it requires a lot of logistical planning, and it’s hard work – although it does bring in a lot of money. But, to be honest, at first I was very angry with them for putting Hungary in such a situation. The Hungarian government shouldn’t have needed to intervene here, because they should have had the sense not to invite such a band here. So is the rotten money so important that it’s worth it for them? But then I calmed down and looked at what legal options we had, and over a number of days we worked calmly and quietly to find the right legal solution that would allow us to ban such people from the country. Our legal system is very clear that Hungary is a free country. It’s an island of peace, and the basic principle is that we live here in peace with one another, and no one can be the subject of verbal abuse on the grounds of their religion or ancestry. There’s no place for that here. If you come to Hungary, you must obey our laws! Better not come, my friend.
But if we look at the big picture, recently there have been several cases in which rather strange things have happened in the name of artistic self-expression. In your opinion, how much longer will there be tolerance for one another’s views, or the expression of such views?
I don’t think that this is what it’s about. It’s an exciting debate, but why is it heating up eight months before the election? Because it’s not about that: it’s about the election. When it comes to democratic dilemmas it’s worth looking at America, because that’s where it all started – although the French would argue that they started it, but let’s put that aside for now. In America, too, a significant proportion of artists support the liberal candidates, the Democratic Party. The same thing happens here. And then sometimes they go too far. One person says that the Right – the voters he doesn’t like – are “protozoa”, another imitates the shooting of the Prime Minister on stage, and a third calls farmers chimpanzees. So we see everything here. But this is already the election campaign. So this isn’t about artistic freedom in general, but about the fact that a significant segment of artists and show business – let’s admit that it’s the majority, and this is also the case in America – align themselves with the liberal parties of the Left. This is also happening in Hungary. We shouldn’t doubt that they’re getting paid for it, but that’s life. It didn’t help them in America. It usually doesn’t help. In my opinion, voters don’t like it when otherwise popular – perhaps even respected – people in show business want to tell them what to think about life and politics. This didn’t work in America either. I agree with those who think that this benefits us, who are under attack. I don’t think that this harms us politically, and it may even be beneficial. It certainly helps us to see things more clearly.
Among the subjects I’ve been asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about in Tusnádfürdő/Băile Tuşnad were the significance of the Bálványos Free University, the threats in Ukraine, and the EU budget.