Good morning to everyone. Thank you very much for inviting me here to be with you.
Policy for the Hungarian nation is a great challenge for every Hungarian government – it is, after all, the most complicated part of the profession. It is not easy to make economic policy or good education policy, but policy for the Hungarian nation is extremely difficult and complicated because of the many actors – some of whom are also outside our jurisdiction. The other day I was in Transylvania/Erdély – how complicated policy for the nation is! I was at the [Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania/RMDSZ] congress with Hunor and the others. You unsuspectingly go into a pub where there is a gypsy musician and sing a couple of songs together, and there is trouble. And yet, as the old farmer in the old joke would say, it never occurred to me that singing “No, No, We’re Not Leaving Here” would suddenly take on a different meaning in terms of national policy from what it would have in Budapest. And if it’s topped off with “Good Evening, the Hussars of Fehérvár Have Arrived”, then the trouble really starts. That’s more or less the situation. This clearly shows that this is an area where not a single word can be uttered without weighing up the risk. This also applies to our meeting today, so I will try to conform to this, or to phrase things accurately, in a manner worthy of it.
I suggest that we move from the inside towards the outside, so let’s talk first about the most current and burning issue, and then outline the context of the current situation. The most important current situation now can be summed up in this simple dilemma: war or peace. In Hungarian domestic politics we tend to say that if there is work, there is everything. But this is also true of foreign policy: if there is peace, there is everything – or even if there is not, then it is possible. If, on the other hand, there is war, then many things are not possible. Therefore the fundamental question now for the Hungarian community in the Carpathian Basin – both within and beyond the current borders – is what will happen in Europe: Will there be war or peace? We are in a strange war, aren’t we? By its own definition, Europe is at war. So European leaders – including the leaders of the largest nation states and the leaders of European institutions – talk about the Russo–Ukrainian war as if it is our war, and as if Europe is at war. Now let us not get caught up in the not unimportant detail that the EU’s Founding Treaty – which is not crystal clear everywhere, but especially in this case it is at its sharpest, most emphatic and most comprehensible – states that matters of foreign and security policy fall exclusively within the competence of EU Member States and the Council that brings the Member States together. This means that in this regard the Commission has no cards. In comparison, every day you can see that the President of the Commission, Mrs. von der Leyen, is travelling around the world, doing nothing but talk about the war, something for which, incidentally, she has no mandate or competence. This clearly shows that there’s a kind of war psychosis, a kind of competition in Europe for who can represent pro-war positions the most belligerently. This war we are in – and despite what Hungarians want, I have to speak in the first-person plural, because we are members of the EU, and although Hungary is not at war, the EU presents itself as such – is a strange war, because in the minds of Hungarians war is associated with fighting, and of the kind that involves direct, physical contact. And today Europe is not fighting such a war: soldiers from European Union states are not stationed in Ukraine – or if they are, they are only there clandestinely and only for certain tasks, and they are certainly not stationed near the front line. So today European people, citizens of European Union countries, are not fighting a battle in the physical sense. Yet the European Union sees itself as a continent, an entity that is at war. This means that we are not fighting, but are letting someone else fight. This used to be called a “proxy war”, but the meaning of that term was that whoever is behind the actual warring party should remain hidden, so that they do not have to admit that they are actually behind the force or forces fighting on the front lines. This was called a proxy war. This is not that, because here the European Union openly admits that we are actually behind the Ukrainian troops fighting on the front line. In fact they say, “We cannot lose, we will win” – in the first-person plural. Moreover, American peace efforts have been thwarted by European resistance. So today the Russo–Ukrainian war has this strange dynamic: the American president wants peace and is negotiating with both the Ukrainians and the Russians, while European leaders want the war to continue and are not negotiating with the Russians, only with the Ukrainians, and are doing everything they can to move the Americans from the side of peace efforts to Europe’s pro-Ukrainian position. I could also say, in simple terms, that if European leaders had not hacked the peace negotiations, if they had not done everything to ensure that the American president was unsuccessful in them, then the Russo–Ukrainian, European and American grand package, grand agreement, would have already been created. This is not happening because, for various reasons, the Europeans want the war to continue. It was in a meeting in Copenhagen two weeks ago that I heard a statement that was harsher than any I had heard before – especially from the mouth of a German. The essence of it we of course knew to be true, but it was not usually spoken about in this way: that we are at war, this is a war, we have a war strategy, and the European Union must win this war; and the way to win the war is to have a material war – which means both men and physical equipment. In this war, they say, the Russians will be exhausted sooner than the Ukrainians – whom we Europeans support wholeheartedly. This will cause economic chaos and crisis in Russia, which will lead to political chaos in Russia; and in this way “we” will win the war by weakening the Russians – to the point that the territories currently in Russian hands will be retaken by the Ukrainian army. This is the goal. I am only telling you this because obviously you often only get information from the press and not through direct negotiations in connection with the war. But the reality is that those who are in decision-making positions in Europe today have a war strategy – we talk about it openly among ourselves. I am the one who opposes it, there are those who are known to oppose it but do not say anything, but the vast majority of countries are part of this war strategy – the scenario and plan for which goes as far as converting the entire European economy into a kind of war economy. So the question of war and peace is not some philosophical one far away from us, on the Ukrainian front or high above our heads, but the daily reality of European politics. Just in Copenhagen they wanted to immediately – with a single decision – give 40 billion euros to the Ukrainians, who have run out of money. Moreover, we are not only talking about war and peace, but also about its economic consequences, the magnitude of which is as follows: so far the EU has spent approximately 180 billion euros on the war – 180 billion! And since the Ukrainians regularly run out of money, ever more package proposals are being put on the table. The most recent one is a 40-billion-euro package – which of course was not adopted, but that is another story.
And one of the most exciting issues – if we were not talking about war, I could even call it intellectual excitement – that is particularly engrossing for lawyers is the seized Russian currency reserves. These are not even assets, but currency reserves, which are, of course, the property of the Central Bank of Russia, which has stationed part of its currency reserves in Europe – like many other countries, including Arab countries. Rich countries like to keep their foreign exchange reserves in the currencies of different countries, in reserve currencies, including the euro. This is a significant amount. It is worth between 150 and 170 billion euros. In Copenhagen we talked about how to take this from the bank deposit where it is kept and how to use it in this, that, and whatever other legally breathtaking and inventive way to finance the expenses of the war in Ukraine. In the EU this requires a unanimous decision, although of course they are working on a legal solution to avoid any unanimous decision, but according to common sense and the laws in force, at this moment such a decision requires unanimity. As an aside, I will just note that I have contacted the Russians, and we are currently clarifying with the Russians the question of what countermeasures can be expected if such a decision is made in the EU. For example, will the assets of Hungarian companies in Russia be confiscated or not? Many of our Hungarian companies, both large and small, are still in areas not subject to sanctions and are extremely active in Russia. If as a response these companies or their assets are seized, then it will be quite difficult for me to find a reason for Hungary to support the seizure of frozen Russian assets, since Hungarian companies will in part be paying the price. That was my aside.
I am only telling you this to help you understand that when we talk about war we are not only talking about human lives – although that is the most important thing. We are not only talking about destruction, which is also at the top of the priority list, but we are also talking about money and the economy: a great deal of money and serious economic consequences. If you have had time to look at the news about the draft of the European Union’s next seven-year budget, the first, let’s say, drafts or detailed drafts of which have already been published, you can see that 20–25 per cent of the next seven-year budget – 20–25 per cent of the money – is actually making its way over to Ukraine under various legal titles. This is even though Ukraine is not yet a member of the European Union, but is still an entity operating separately from it. So, returning to the essence of what I was saying, the issue of war and peace – the issue of European politics today, and thus the one that also affects us, the people of the Carpathian Basin – is more acute than at any time in the past three years. So the danger of Europe stepping in, getting involved, stumbling, getting lost, and marching into a war that will then bring with it ever deeper involvement, is now at its highest since the outbreak of the war. This is how we stand at the moment.
Hungary has a counterproposal, but every proposal is worth only as much as the strength behind it, and for Hungary at the moment we know what magnitude that is: in the European debates it cannot be considered decisive in any way. It is still a duty of honour, a Christian duty, an intellectual duty, to formulate our own proposals as a Member State that opposes the position of the others. Because our plan is not to obstruct or destroy; instead we have a clear vision of the future, different from the others, the meaning and benefit of which we want to convince those who hold opinions different from, or opposed to, ours. So Hungary’s position is that Europe should do what the Americans are doing: negotiate. There has been a moral barrier to this. After the Russian president was declared a war criminal, there was a moral barrier related to whether it was possible to negotiate with a person of such a status. But this question became peripheral after the American president negotiated with the Russian president in Alaska. This is quite aside from the fact that if it is possible – and indeed necessary – to negotiate with Hamas, then it is not clear why in the case of a war that is much closer and more important to us, we should not negotiate with any of the warring parties we need to negotiate with. So the Hungarian proposal is that Europe should not sit in the audience, not wait to be invited to Washington, to be seated in a row of chairs in front of the CEO’s table, his desk – causing rather embarrassing moments for European voters, seeing their leaders being called to account at a meeting with the CEO. So we should not do that, but should behave in a way that corresponds to our actual strength. And by asserting our strength, we should negotiate with the Russians independently as Europe, and not wait to derive some position for ourselves from the Russo–American agreement.
Incidentally, I would note that there may be 140 million Russians, but the population of the European Union exceeds 400 million. The GDP of the European Member States is I don’t know how many times larger than the Russian GDP, but it is many times larger. So we are far superior to the Russians in both population and economic power. And the military budget of the twenty-seven European Union Member States also exceeds the military budget of the Russians by many times. So we are even stronger militarily than the Russians – except of course for the issue of nuclear capability, which is a separate story, but at this moment we are comparing conventional weapons, and not preparing for a nuclear war. So the fact is that today Europe is orders of magnitude stronger than Russia, and yet we somehow give the impression that the Russians are strong and we are weak. The simple explanation for this is that the Russians are willing to fight, willing to sacrifice blood and the lives of their military for their goals, which is something we are not yet doing. It is right that we are not doing this, because if we were to use our military power to enter into conflict with Russia, it would obviously mean World War III. So it is right that we do not want to show our power on the battlefield. Up to this point the Hungarian and European Union positions are the same. But if you have power, you simply have to show it somewhere. And if you are not fighting, you can show it in only one place: at the negotiating table. But for that you have to sit down at the negotiating table, where you can negotiate from a position of power. For now, our position that we must negotiate is a position that has been rejected. There are those who philosophically and on principle rule out the possibility of such a negotiation, and there is a president – I have heard such a comment – who has said that of course we will have to negotiate, but not now. What I mean by this is that there are differences in the deeper layers of the European Union’s position, which from the outside seems completely unified.
So, returning to this issue, the Hungarian position is that we should negotiate with the Russians, and try to reach an agreement. I do not think Ukraine is the most important issue for such an agreement. Ukraine is an important issue, but it is not the only issue – nor is it the most important issue. Clearly a new European security system should be built, and armament issues should be clarified: what kind of weapons and how much, how we maintain order, how big our armies are. A treaty should be concluded on this, a control system for this should be established; because in the shadow of the war, the parties have successively terminated the arms agreements that they had concluded in previous decades – all of which they had considered binding on themselves. By the way, we have also plunged into an arms race. Everyone can see that tens and hundreds of billions are flying into arms investments and military-industrial investments, which clearly shows that the previous limits set by international rules have lost their validity. This is a problem, because even if the war were to end, it would certainly not be good for the Hungarian economy – and, through that, the Hungarian people – for us to find ourselves in the middle of an arms race. Hungary is not in a position to spend an ever-increasing slice of its gross national product on armaments. We need to maintain a reasonable level of armaments that result in security; but continuously spending ever more on our weapons in a race, a spiralling race, would be contrary to the interests of the Hungarian people. And there is only one way to stop this spiral: it can be stopped if there is an international agreement, which should be reached primarily between Europe and Russia. Therefore this is the most important issue. Then of course there is Ukraine, the issue of trade, the issue of sanctions, the issue of energy. So there is a long list that would obviously have to be agreed upon with the Russians – not as the result of two days of negotiations, but as the result of longer negotiations. In the coming period you will also see that Ukraine’s membership of the European Union will become an increasingly acute issue, as the military achievements of the Ukrainian army on the front line fall short – although I would add that the Ukrainians’ resistance so far has been a fantastic success and heroic achievement. It is true that the Europeans are much stronger overall than the Russians, but if I compare Russia with Ukraine, then that is no longer the case. The Ukrainians are far behind the Russians, are suffering from incredible disadvantages – and yet, with huge sacrifices and heroic resistance, they have been able to stop such a large, powerful Russian war machine. But despite all this, Ukraine has lost a fifth of its territory, its economy is essentially in ruins, and the Ukrainian economy cannot function without European Union money: we are paying Ukrainian pensions, we are paying Ukrainian salaries, we are paying the Ukrainian army, and we are also paying for the purchase of Ukrainian military equipment. The Americans, as you know, have pulled out of this, and they are not giving a single penny. They are selling American weapons to the Europeans, which we buy for hundreds of billions, of course; and then we are sending these weapons to Ukraine. From now on, this war will not cost the Americans a single cent. And knowing the Americans, I think they are winning rather than losing in the arms sales, while we, the Europeans, are spending like there is no tomorrow. That is the situation.
The result of this is that the European economy is stagnating, due to this atmosphere of war and politics; the war is stifling and blocking economic development. This is particularly true of the German economic zone, of course – if you look at the Austrian or German figures, you can see this. So we can safely venture to say that as long as there is war, the European economy cannot start to develop; at best, it will remain in a state of stagnation – or in a category, or on a path, of barely perceptible growth. If the war were to end, if we could conclude it with peace, or at least a ceasefire, there are various estimates; but in my opinion economic growth would at least triple within a very short time. In Hungary, for example, this would mean that instead of 1 per cent, it would suddenly be 3 per cent. Although every economy can always be improved, the Hungarian economy’s undoubted existing weaknesses are not structural but fundamentally cyclical in nature, and related to the war. So the Hungarian economy as we know it would perform much better if peace and a ceasefire could be achieved. This is another strong reason for the Hungarian government to persevere – if only for the economic well-being of our own citizens – with its policy of supporting peace and a ceasefire and opposing the war. Broadly speaking, this is the most pressing issue.
European prime ministers will hold a meeting next week, on 22, 23 and 24 October, and we will meet at least once more before December. The agenda items will focus exclusively on the war, the financing of the war, the fate of the frozen Russian assets, and accelerating Ukraine’s membership of the European Union. Perhaps the good news is that – alongside the Slovaks, whose fundamental economic interests are just as deeply affected by the war as Hungary’s – it seems that the Czechs will also take a different path. This is provided that the will of Czech voters prevails in the formation of the Government. If I am not mistaken, the elections were won by a more rational, common-sense party or party group, the patriots; but forming a government obviously does not happen overnight, and given that the Czech structure of power is much more divided than the Hungarian one, the process of forming a government may take longer than what we Hungarians are used to in our own affairs. Well, even so, if the Czech government formation is successful, there will be four prime ministers out of the twenty-seven in the European Council who are more or less openly pro-peace, grounded in common sense, and opposed to any kind of bureaucratic centralisation in Brussels: the Italians, the Slovaks, the Czechs, and us Hungarians. That’s already four countries. We should also note that everything in Poland is creaking and cracking, and the Polish president is clearly pursuing a strategy that is different from that of the Polish government. The Polish president is directly elected, so we have good reason to hope that if the three of us are there, only the Poles will be missing, and they will only be “half missing”. In that case the V4 [Visegrád 4] can be relaunched.
Hungary is holding the V4 presidency from July this year until July next year. This is still a long time, and I am waiting for the outcome of the Czech government formation, because once the three of us are in place, we will try to relaunch the V4, which had been a very successful form of cooperation until recently, when in essence it was crippled and dismantled through the involvement of Brussels and Berlin. There is nothing new under the sun, and this is the same historical pattern that you are familiar with from the past two to three hundred years: an area between the Germanic world and the Russian, Slavic, world that is capable of organising itself, joining forces, asserting its interests, and engendering a lot of opposition to itself. There are many who have no interest in the existence in Central Europe of a large, coordinated political and economic bloc of some sixty million people. And if the four of us are not all simultaneously sufficiently determined, these external attempts could tear our cooperation apart – as has happened in recent times. Well, that is the immediate situation in Europe at the moment.
I consider this a fantastic achievement, and we must salute the players in the Hungarian economy for being able to run the country’s economy in such circumstances that enable us to run three epoch-making programmes at the same time. We are currently running the largest first-time home ownership programme in Hungary’s history, with a first-time home purchase loan scheme which is extremely favourable by Hungarian standards, and which has generated enormous interest and participation. We are also running a programme for Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises with a similarly favourable interest rate. And we are running Europe’s largest tax reduction programme, because from 1 October mothers who have given birth to three children will not pay income tax for the rest of their lives – regardless of the age of their children. And in January we will also begin to develop this support system for parents with two children. Meanwhile, we are doubling the tax allowance for families with children in two phases: half of it has already been done, and the other half will be done on 1 January. This is despite the fact that there is a war going on, sucking up our energy, our money, our blood, our vitality, and that the Hungarian economy is burdened by all the woes of the war and the resultant economic slowdown. Yet the Hungarian economy is capable of running three such programmes at once, which shows that the players in the Hungarian economy have spirit and vitality. Well, that is pretty much the situation in the world immediately around us.
I do not know how much time I have, but if I dare to venture further than that, then I can say that I looked at what we talked about last year – and last year we talked about how the old world we knew before is essentially falling apart, disintegrating. Now, a year has passed since then, and we can say that what is replacing it, what we might call a new world order, is in its infancy, with recognisable forms, like a baby. It is far from being a mature system, but its outlines and forms are already visible, so we can roughly estimate what kind of world we will be living in for the next fifteen to twenty years. So much has happened in the past year that these contours have become visible.
The most important event since our last meeting has been the radical political shift in America. In January this year a patriotic government took office, contrasting with previous administrations, which, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to as globalist governments. Here we must speak cautiously about this, but in America, in the United States, it is not embarrassing to say that the government that has taken office is nationalist, and is trying to preserve – at the cost of significant changes – the United States’ leading role in the global economy and world politics. But what is most important for us is that this new American leadership has turned away from ideological foundations back to foundations of common sense, and is pursuing a kind of common-sense policy – a policy of peace – everywhere in the world.
The second important thing that is shaping the new world is that peace talks have begun between the Russians and the Americans. I am sure that there will be an agreement between them: the Americans and the Russians will agree on the fate of Europe. The only question is whether the Europeans will be able to have a say in this.
The third development that describes the contours of this new world is a new international order of cooperation that does not include the Americans – let’s call it the Eastern world, or BRICS, if you like. An unexpected turn of events has seen the two strongest powers outside America, which used to be at odds with each other, now taking great strides towards each other: we are talking about China and India. This is obviously not unrelated to the fact that the Americans, for some mysterious reason, decided to impose tariffs of over 100 per cent on India, thereby bringing the Indians – after the Russians – into an alliance system that does not include American or Western elements. So, whatever the reason for this development, we can see that the Eastern world’s system of cooperation is growing stronger and clearer.
The fourth important development that gives us some indication of what the next twenty years will bring is the Middle East peace process, about which there are, of course, many illusions on the surface. What has happened is a huge achievement: hostages have been released, and, for the moment at least, people are not killing each other. This is a great achievement compared to previous years, but this is only the first chapter of the agreement. The second chapter is much more complicated, as it aims to simultaneously place the entire Gaza Strip under a new administrative system, a new system of military supervision, and a new economic system. On this there are many more unresolved details than answers to the questions. There are signed agreements, there are directions and there are intentions, but translating all this into an enforceable political scenario is a task that will take many, many months – and one that will obviously not proceed in a straight line. There will be setbacks, as is always the case in the Middle East.
Another important factor is that, due to the war, the European Union is unable to halt the unfavourable process that is leading to a steady decline in its share of the global economy. The most alarming figure we have to work with is that sometime around 2007–08 the share of the world’s total output contributed by the Americans and Europeans was somewhere around 25 per cent. The Americans are still roughly there today, somewhere between 23 and 25 per cent, while our contribution has fallen below 18 per cent. And this process is continuing. So it seems that Europe’s decline in global economic importance is not temporary, but will be a permanent feature for the next fifteen to twenty years.
Well, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Of course, while these processes are taking place, something decisive is happening – behind them, above them, below them, it is difficult to say – that receives much less attention, even though for the course of our destiny it is at least as important as what we see and what is above the surface. This is the huge technological transformation that a few years ago we were talking and thinking about as if it were science fiction. Inventions, phenomena and innovations that previously only appeared in science fiction literature will become commonplace on a daily basis. And these technological innovations will be incorporated into the functioning of the more developed countries of the global economy – including that of us Hungarians – at such a rapid pace that the impact in the next few years will be explosive. This will break down the door within two or three years. This is the case with robotisation, where completely new dimensions have opened up, and in the field of energy, where the capacity to store renewable energy is growing exponentially month by month, thanks to Chinese developments. This is the case with artificial intelligence, which we talk about a lot but know little about in reality; but it is now clear that services based on artificial intelligence have arrived in our everyday lives. So now, as someone who is interested in modern technology but observes it from a distance, I can tell you that while you used to say that you had to “Google something”, when I say that now my children laugh at me. That is no longer what happens: now you have to talk to a machine, ask it a question, it answers you, and if you ask more questions, it gives you more refined answers. Now this is also how I work. If I suddenly need some data, I don’t type on a device: I say, “Tell me”, and it tells me. And this speeds everything up, transforms everything, and changes everything. First our capacity to produce data grew, but the key development in the coming years will be the ability to use, organise, and rapidly feed into decisions the massive volume of data the world has generated over the past twenty or thirty years – and this is moving forward at breakneck speed. This will transform everything. To put it simply, maintaining these huge databases requires enormous technological developments and supercomputers, and supplying them will require nuclear power plants. So operating such large artificial intelligence centres will require such a large amount of energy, electrical energy, that it can only be satisfied with completely new electrical energy investments. For this even Paks will not be enough. A small mobile nuclear power plant can be installed next to a large data centre or an industrial centre and will be capable of supplying only that facility without connecting to the national economy’s general, large distribution system. It is no coincidence that you can see them being built, even though they have not yet started operating. These changes are all happening right before our eyes.
The key issue is that while there is no peace, while competitiveness in Europe is declining, while we are running three programmes that would be difficult to run separately, Hungary should not get stuck in the present, but should remain part of these trail-blazing processes and developments of the future. To achieve this, we must not change our foreign policy – which, in contrast to the formation of blocs, pays attention to all parts of the world and seeks to acquire the knowledge and technological innovation that is at the highest level and that Hungary needs most. So we must not stand solely by the Chinese, the Americans, or anyone else, copying their technological solutions, but rather we must take advantage of our situation – from energy production to robotisation to artificial intelligence – and we must gather the best elements from everywhere and combine them into a Hungarian strategy for the future. Government Commissioner László Palkovics has undertaken to do this, and is coordinating the work. Politics is naturally dominated by international relations, war, and the current economic data that is featured in the daily news. Meanwhile there must also be a government knowledge centre and response capability that continuously evaluates modern technological developments and advancements from the perspective of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin, and that prevents us from falling behind in the future. This is because those who do not participate in these developments may be successful today, but will certainly fall behind tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. This will require serious effort.
I do not know to what extent our organisations beyond the border have this type of capability. Obviously the RMDSZ has it, because they are in government and have access to a great deal of knowledge – state knowledge, a wealth of state knowledge. And we also have Sapientia, where such things can be studied. But I would encourage everyone who has access to knowledge and insight into modern technology in their own country to make use of it – I am not encouraging industrial espionage; there are organisations designated for that purpose. And I would not ask the Hungarian Standing Conference to deal with such matters; but every thought, observation, direction and insight is very valuable. Therefore I ask the member organisations of the Hungarian Standing Conference to address this issue. Zsolt, I specifically ask you to add knowledge about future technologies and the collection and systematisation of such knowledge to the traditional minority issues. Create some kind of forum so that this wealth of knowledge does not remain scattered, but can be brought together. I am sure that Minister – or rather Government Commissioner – Palkovics will be at the disposal of all of you.
After this, I would like to say a few words about our relations with our neighbours, given that tomorrow morning tasks related to them may be the most immediate ones facing the organisations represented here. We have already discussed Ukraine, so there is no need to say more about that. We are in a very difficult situation. Ukraine is hostile towards Hungary. A minority living in such a hostile country will never be left untouched. They are deeply embedded in Hungarian politics and the economy. Despite all its weaknesses, Ukraine is a serious country, and when we talk about its ability to assert its interests as a foreign power, we have to take it seriously. After all, more than ten million Ukrainians have left for Western Europe. Some of them left Ukraine with a specific task, some here to Hungary, where they have built up strong links in areas ranging from the media to politics and economic life. They have a clear vision of how to change current Hungarian sovereigntist foreign policy in a way that is more favourable to Ukraine. One should not react to this phenomenon with emotion. In the opposite situation, we would probably do exactly the same. Perhaps we would do it a little more elegantly, because we are Hungarians after all, and we would not confuse requests with demands – but that does not affect the essence of the matter. But it is obviously in Ukraine’s interest to involve as many European countries as possible in this war, which for it is a matter of life and death. So I recommend against giving in to our emotions, but instead we should use common sense and patience when dealing with this undoubtedly hostile, extremely difficult, tense and bad relationship between Ukraine and Hungary. Let us keep our cool and constantly remind ourselves of the importance of patience. So let us remain calm and composed, without compromising Hungarian interests, and let us support our community across the border – because they are going through very difficult times and still have very difficult months ahead of them until a series of negotiations can bring the war to a peaceful conclusion with a ceasefire or peace treaty. In any case, I would like to publicly assure the leaders here, the leaders who have come from Ukraine, that Hungary stands wholeheartedly behind the Hungarian minority living in Transcarpathia, that the Hungarian community there can count on us in every way, and there is no resource needed for the maintenance of our community that we cannot or do not want to make available to the Hungarians of Transcarpathia.
As far as cooperation with the Romanians is concerned, we are living in times when Romanian–Hungarian relations are not the most important question. There are enough internal problems, and work needs to be done to ensure the functioning of the economy. I congratulate the RMDSZ on their efforts in this extremely difficult situation. I do not know if it can be resolved at all, when a country with an 8–9 per cent budget deficit... 9.4? Is that a Romanian figure? So we have to use a Romanian figure of 9.4 per cent. They are carrying a twin deficit. In such a period, it is important to exercise governmental responsibility in a way that does not abuse the trust of our own voters and likewise does not abuse the trust of the Romanians – the well-established trust placed by Romanians in the RMDSZ due to its expertise. At the same time political capital within the political elite should not be squandered through internal government disputes. This is a task that is very difficult to accomplish. So I can only congratulate the President of the RMDSZ and the entire RMDSZ for having stood their ground in this difficult situation for months now, achieving one feat after another. I do not know if we can assist in this situation, or if assisting would do any good, but that is not for us to decide: it is up to the RMDSZ. But I would like to tell President Hunor Kelemen that Hungary is, of course, ready to help. After all, to put it simply, we brought the Romanians into the Schengen Area in the second half of last year, and without us they would never have got there. After all this creates a certain basis of trust, and for the time being nothing has gone wrong with the new prime minister. So I can say that we are facing enormous opportunities, nothing has gone wrong with the Prime Minister, and we can keep Romanian–Hungarian intergovernmental relations within reasonable limits. I think this can also help the work of the RMDSZ over there.
There is no point in talking about Austria here, as that is a clear-cut case. The patriots won the election, but they are not being allowed to form a government. That is German democracy – or Germanic democracy – at the moment. In the other Germany, the most popular German party is constantly threatened with being banned. So there are enough problems in the Germanic world. We have a balanced relationship with the Austrian chancellor, and we cooperate in European Council meetings wherever we can. The Austrians are not known for voicing their opinions loudly, so on that they always need help. Throughout history we have always stepped up to this task, as it is in our interest to do so; we are of course ready to assist them now, and we trust that sooner or later the party that wins the election in Austria will be able to form a government. How interesting it would be if they tried that. There are other places where the party that wins the election forms the government, so perhaps it could be attempted in Austria as well.
We owe a debt of gratitude to our politicians in Vajdaság/Vojvodina for the Serbian–Hungarian relationship. Our attempts to build a strategic partnership between Belgrade and Budapest would come to nothing without them: the distance is too great, and without support, that bridge would not stand. This support must come from Vajdaság/Vojvodina, from Szabadka/Subotica – and we will receive it. So I am grateful to President Pásztor for continuing his father’s work. I know that the situation is difficult, and it is not my place to comment on Serbian domestic political events, but we trust that Serbia will emerge from this situation unscathed, and that this strategically important Serbian–Hungarian cooperation will continue. I do not want to get too far ahead of myself, but if natural order is restored in Poland, the Czechs form their government, Slovakia holds out, Hungary stands its ground, Austria makes an attempt to have the winning party form a government, and the Serbs stick to their common-sense foreign policy, then we will be talking about a very strong Central European bloc. Its countries may not agree on every issue, but on the most important strategic issues it will be possible to coordinate their interests. And this will present a completely different Europe – one feature of which will be that the economic growth potential of this region far exceeds that of Western European countries. It is true that they are richer and have more capital, but the future is not on their side, it is on the side of Central Europeans. And if we can bring the Central European countries together in such a system, it could mean a completely different Europe over the next fifteen to twenty years.
We have a distinctive relationship with Croatia. Every time there is a European summit, I hold talks with the Croatian prime minister. On the one hand Croatia has very good economic figures, so its macroeconomic indicators are quite impressive. On the other hand, its population is steadily declining, which also raises questions of national strategy for Croatia. The proportion of Hungarians working abroad is roughly the same as that of Austrians working abroad. So we feel the negative, destructive consequences of such a “brain drain” much less than any other country in Central Europe. I am not saying that we do not feel it at all, but the proportion of those working abroad is between 6 and 7 per cent, which is the same as the proportion of Austrians working abroad. All other Central European countries suffer from greater problems – and that is particularly true for Croatia. I congratulate the representatives of the Hungarians in Croatia, because I see that, in all my discussions with the Croatian Prime Minister, a recurring theme is that the Hungarians living in Croatia are predictable, reliable, and well-prepared partners in governing and in creating a government majority. This is no small achievement, so thank you very much for your work!
Moving over to Slovenia, we see that there will be an election there in March at the latest, if I am not mistaken. This always happens a month or two before the Hungarian election – or at least that was the case last time. Slovenia is a very mysterious country. The reason is not worth discussing in this open forum, but much more of the past remains there than we might assume. We see Slovenia as a Western country, and it has always been the most developed country in the region, right behind Austria. It was the first to introduce the euro, and the whole country gives a very Western impression. But if we look at its power structure, it is a very, very difficult country. Hungarian representatives can experience this first-hand every day – it is not easy to hold one’s ground there. I am very confident that after the election a more fortunate period will follow, an easier period for Hungarians in Slovenia than the last three or four years have been. For example, Slovenia is the only country with which we have been unable to struggle our way to an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline. We have already managed to diversify our supply system with every other country. It would be in Hungary’s fundamental interest for us to have high-capacity links to Italy’s enormous energy system, but for what seems like an eternity we’ve been unable to reach an agreement with Slovenia. We’re successful in the field of electricity, but this isn’t the case with the gas pipeline system – even though it would be a huge relief for Hungary, because through the Italian system we’d also have access to North African oil and gas, as well as the pipeline system that transports it. But it’s not easy to reach an agreement with the Slovenians on this issue. This clearly shows that Slovenia is a key country, and not a simple case.
And then there are the Hungarians in Felvidék and Slovakia. If fifteen years ago someone had said that if the Hungarian prime minister were to be absent during the first half of a European Council meeting, say because a public holiday coincided with that meeting, and that he would have to entrust someone to represent the Hungarian position, and that someone would be the Slovak prime minister, I can say that fifteen years ago we would have said, “Stop right there, the leader of the Hungarian government requires an immediate psychiatric examination.” Because that’s how things stood back then. Of course this also required Poland to zigzag or run off course somewhat. But now the situation is that if Hungary is unable to be there in person during the first few hours of the meeting for some reason – say, because of the 23 October holiday – and someone has to represent Hungary’s position, someone we trust to represent what we ask of them and who will not conceal anything in the Hungarian position out of convenience or cowardice, then we need to ask the Slovaks and the Slovak Prime Minister to be kind enough to represent the Hungarian position. And this is possible. This is a very encouraging and instructive sign for the future. No relationship is hopeless. I’m not claiming that all the conflicts accumulated throughout history can be resolved within the foreseeable future, because there are truths that are mutually incompatible and cannot be resolved overnight – such things exist. But it is possible to cooperate, to help one another, and to agree on certain issues. Serbian–Hungarian relations are a very good example of this, and Slovak–Hungarian relations are another example – as perhaps illustrated by the little anecdote I’ve just told you. We will build more bridges. We have just celebrated the anniversary of the opening of the bridge at Esztergom, we will build another large freight bridge over the Danube, and we are working with the Slovaks on the implementation of a major economic package. Slovakia has become perhaps our third most important trading partner, which is a huge development compared to the previous period. Previously almost all of our neighbours shunned any kind of connectivity, because they considered connections between border areas, areas here with those on the other side of the border, to be a threat to the national economy or to national security. There’s hardly anything left of that now – and nothing in the case of the Slovaks, for example. Although there are parties that say such things from time to time, this is not part of government policy, and therefore the connection between Felvidék, southern Slovakia, and Hungarian territories is a jointly declared Slovak–Hungarian government goal.
I hope I have not left anyone out. Let us not talk about future neighbours now – we will do that another time. In any case, thank you very much for listening patiently.
We should also say a few words of thanks to the diaspora, because they have not had an easy time of things recently. I suppose this varies from country to country, but if you talk to hairdressers, taxi drivers and football fans, Hungary’s prestige is good. But if you talk to politicians and journalists, it is not. And since public opinion is most easily influenced through the media, on numerous occasions Hungarians living in the diaspora have had to make an effort and show courage when standing up for some of Hungary’s decisions. All I can say to encourage you is that Hungarians are not right, but will be right; there is a little arrogance in this statement, of course, but there is also a lot of truth in it. And the issue of migration is an extremely inspiring case, when the whole Western world – even in America, where the winds were blowing in a different direction at the time – opposed us. Migration seemed to be a kind of globalist blessing that would bring about a new kind of world, in which – to use a biblical image – the lamb and the wolf would lie down together. This conjured up images and ideas of how enlightened we would be and how sublime it would be to be able to coexist with huge masses of people from foreign cultures. And reality shows that this may happen, but it will not be tomorrow morning, and therefore such processes must be handled very carefully: we must know how to say “no”, we must know how to stop such masses. For this our only reward for many years was to be subjected to the rod, but today there is no Western European country – especially not America – where they would disagree with the Hungarian position. They may not always say that it is the Hungarian position, but what they say is the same as what we have been saying since 2015. And believe me, it will be the same with the war. I know it is difficult because the liberal, left-liberal media – together with the ruling elite – champion a pro-Ukrainian and therefore pro-war foreign policy, framed as being morally based. But that is a doomed, misguided political strategy – just as for migration; and this will become apparent in matters of war and peace. I think it will take no more than a year or two for the Hungarian position to be seen as the right one. We have attempted to pursue a sober and calm foreign policy in the Ukrainian–Russian war, based on the identification of European interests. And today this is not the case, as I know and can see. But thank you for standing your ground in this difficult situation and representing the Hungarian position – if not with death-defying courage, then at least with courage in the face of the media, which is not so far removed from the former. So we would also like to thank the Hungarian diaspora for standing their ground in recent years.
In summary, I can tell you that the national policy outlined in his introduction by Zsolt Semjén, which is based on sound philosophy, also applies at the practical level of national policy, two or three levels below. And I believe that this will not change in the coming period. The election is a long way off, and I do not want to talk about that now; that is not why we are here. But I am convinced that Hungary is in a position, both spiritually and in terms of awareness, in which power cannot be won by the forces pursuing policies against Hungarians living abroad – who, let’s say, want to take away their right to vote, or do not want to connect the Hungarian communities beyond the border with the mother country as strongly we want to, or do not realise that every single forint that we make available to these communities is also a matter of life and death for Hungarians living within our borders. So in my opinion the forces that do not realise all this cannot come to power in Hungary. So the change over the past fifteen years – say, compared to December 2004 – is that there will be no return to the era when Hungarians were not seen as a whole, as a nation, but as communities living in different states, belonging to those states, and therefore not the responsibility of the Hungarian state. That era is over. I am convinced that it will not return, so Hungarians living beyond the borders can look forward with confidence to the coming months and to the Hungarian election.
This is not a party-political statement, although I do have an opinion on that. But the point is that there was a term, which you may remember, called the central field of power. We introduced this sometime in 2010, but due to the superficiality of journalism – with apologies to the journalists – it was interpreted as meaning that a political map had to be drawn: that the central field of power meant that there is a centre with forces to the right and left of it, but that it will always be the forces in the middle that will obtain the majority necessary for governance. That is one interpretation of the central field of power. But since I was the one who introduced this concept, I clearly remember that this was not what it was about. Instead it was about building a central field of power around issues, not around positions of power: Hungarian society must reach – or be led to, or be helped to reach – three or four fundamental policy areas that form the centre of politics; and no matter what changes in political power occur, this core will remain untouched. This is the central field of power that must not be touched. Such areas are the support of families, the work-based economy, and the unity of the nation – according to which countries have borders, but the nation does not. And this must be reflected in politics. This is the central field of power, and I believe that this central field of power has been created in terms of issues. I am not saying that it is irrelevant, but how the political actors are organised around these few core areas is secondary; I am not saying that these issues have become sacrosanct, but they have become a central political and cultural base that simply cannot be touched. This is not because they are under some kind of sacred protection, which would be good and might be the case, but we do not need to discuss that now. One should not touch these issues, because anyone who does will certainly lose the trust of the electorate and will not be able to retain or earn their recognition. I think this work has progressed well over the past decade or more. Of course I hope that we will not have to test whether these foundations can be undermined, but rather leave them undisturbed as they are. But I am convinced that today, as a result of our joint efforts, the organisations of Hungarians living abroad – in their personal and family lives and as a community – stand on unshakably strong foundations in financial, political and legal terms.
This has involved a lot of work in the recent period. Since the next Hungarian Standing Conference will take place after the next election, if I understand correctly, it is only fair and proper that I thank you, the member organisations of the Hungarian Standing Conference, for the support received from you over the past fifteen years. I am glad that we have been able to work together, and I would like nothing more than to continue this work with you at the next Hungarian Standing Conference session.
Thank you very much for your attention.