Krisztián Lentulai: Welcome to Mandiner’s YouTube channel. My name is Krisztián Lentulai. Our guest on today’s show is Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary. I could say that he’s our guest, but it turns out that here you’re playing at home and we’re the ones who are the guests.
Yes, because it’s Christmas, and we have a more suitable venue for this than you do.
We’ll try our best. Here we are at the end of 2025. When this programme airs, we’ll be lighting the third Advent candle, the candle of joy. This is a time for quiet reflection and taking stock. Looking back on this year, what are your first thoughts, broadly speaking, about what’s happened in Hungary, what’s happened under your government?
What you say sounds good, but unfortunately it’s not the reality. So you’re right in saying that Advent is a time for quiet reflection, and that’s what we all long for – even in politics. But if you look around the political arena – the front yard of domestic politics and the backyard of foreign affairs – there’s no quiet reflection there: everyone’s shouting at the top of their lungs. Without wanting to offend anyone, domestic politics is noisy and active, and it doesn’t look at all like it wants to end the year. And this is perhaps even more the case in foreign affairs, where there’s not only noise, but also very serious things happening all the time: yesterday, today, and even next week – as next Thursday and Friday there’s the European Union prime ministers’ summit. That will be a truly noisy gathering. So it’s Advent for all of you, but that’s not really granted to us. But that doesn’t help, and I can’t avoid answering your question – it doesn’t help me avoid such a difficult question, about whether it’s possible to describe such a complicated and difficult year as 2025 with one mood, one word, one event. It’s very difficult. So I’d say it was a noisy year.
You could also get out of it by saying that it was the last year before the election – but then surely all of them in the past were like that.
Yes – but then again no. I could say that, but it wouldn’t be true. It would sound plausible, but it wouldn’t be true, because now a lot of things have come together. So it was in January of this year that the old-new American president took office again, but it feels as if it happened a decade ago. And since then, the world has changed. So his inauguration essentially marked the end of an era – not only symbolically, but also in reality. And a new era is clearly beginning to unfold, with increasingly clear outlines of what that new era will be like; and this is the result of the developments of the past ten to twelve months. Therefore this isn’t a normal pre-election year. I’d rather say that, added to the usual pre-election-year noise, there’s a major global change.
We’ve received such nice little embossed notebooks, with hard covers. When I was waiting for you I tried it out, and it stood up firmly like this. I’d say that when we start boring the audience, we can set up a game of Battleship.
Yes, that’s not impossible. I work off this – it’s nice, by the way.
Very. But now I have to do it like this, because we’re not going to play Battleship. However, since you mentioned the old-new American president, a day or two before this programme was recorded I was at a public meeting in my hometown of Tatabánya with my colleague Mátyás Kohán, a foreign policy journalist at Mandiner. The specific topic was his experiences in Washington. I don’t want to disparage my fellow Tatabányans, but I was surprised that so many people in a town the size of Tatabánya were interested in foreign policy. Then, at the end of the public meeting, when the microphone was passed around and the audience had a chance to ask questions, we were asked the kind of foreign policy questions that I had to modestly hand over to my colleague – who’s more knowledgeable in that area. I’d never have thought that we’d be participating in such a high-level “quiz evening”, and I realised that people in Tatabánya – for example, but probably throughout the country – are really interested in foreign policy. I’d never have thought that foreign policy could be such an organic part of an election campaign.
I think there are two things here that help us understand this situation. First, we have this idea that these old industrial towns have enough problems of their own, so they’re bound to care less about events in the outside world than about themselves. But then you go to Ózd, Tatabánya, Komló or Dunaújváros, and you’re surprised to find that this isn’t true. There’s the same openness and interest there, and there isn’t the feeling that “we live in a remote corner of the country” – quite the opposite. These industrial towns are beginning to find their own path in various ways, and the middle-class population there is at least as vibrant, interested and open-minded as any traditional middle-class community. So it’s worth thinking a little differently about our own country. The other issue is that, while this is true, Hungarians shouldn’t be as interested in foreign policy as they are – regardless of the type of settlement they live in. But why are they? The first reason is experience. The collapse of the Soviet Union, say, wasn’t so long ago, and if we look at the history of the 20th century, everyone has experience and knowledge of the fact that what happens in the world will sooner or later appear here in some form. In the 20th century this mostly had negative consequences, so we were more likely to be victims of world events. The only exception to this was the collapse of the Soviet empire, which had an overall beneficial effect on us – because the Soviets left, the communists left, and we were able to start building our own world: one in which we feel more comfortable, one that’s like us and not forced upon us from outside. So, due to historical knowledge, Hungarian public opinion is more sensitive to international affairs than that in other countries. On the other hand, there’s something else in the air: a feeling that something is changing. So people might not be able to precisely deduce the foreign policy implications, but from the news and events that reach them, and from their conversations with one another, a picture emerges that something’s happening. They sense that something’s happening in the world, things that don’t usually happen, things which are signs of a deeper transformation. And that interests people. I think these peculiarities or special moments come together in situations like the one you were fortunate enough to experience, and which I also get to experience quite often.
Your legendary “isolation” – legendary isolation from the other side’s point of view – took a rather interesting turn with this Washington–Moscow–Istanbul trip and its delegation. This also made an impact on the public: there was enormous interest in the reports about it and, if for no other reason, it was as if people sensed that the whole thing was important because of how much we’d be paying to fill our petrol tanks.
That’s right. So I think there are two things at play here. The first is that if the world’s changing, something’s happening that’s being shaped by the big players: the Russians, the Americans, the Turkish world. Where will Hungary’s place be in this? This is an exciting and important question. Secondly, all three countries are needed for Hungary to remain in its special and exceptional position, in which people pay the lowest energy bills compared to other European countries. It’s often the case that you meet foreigners, or you have foreign relatives, or someone – say, from Tatabánya – is working abroad; and when you ask them what it’s like out there, after the first two or three sentences the topic of life becoming unaffordable comes up. We’re not just talking about inflation, because now that’s been curbed here and over there; but, regardless of inflation, in a year or two energy prices have doubled, and household energy costs have doubled. If we round up or estimate what we pay every year on energy bills at around 250,000 to 260,000 forints, then it’s double this for the Romanians, three times this for the Poles, four times this for the Czechs, and even more than this for the Austrians and Germans. It’s true that they earn more, but not that much more. So life is becoming more difficult, especially in one dimension: the supply of energy to households and its price. Hungarians know that Hungary can stay out of this, they feel it – if not from anywhere else, then from their energy bills, which show them how much they’d pay if there were no energy price protection. And everyone knows that if there were no energy price protection, but they had to pay the prices that everyone else pays, then a lower standard of living would immediately come knocking on their door. And they also see that the current government is fighting to prevent this from happening. And we’ve been fighting for this for a good decade now, since we first introduced the reductions in household energy bills in 2013–14. Since then the international situation has only worsened, prices have risen, there’s been inflation, COVID, and then war. And yet we’re still able to maintain the energy cost protection system. And this is in everyone’s interest. This isn’t a party-political issue. So the Moscow–Istanbul–Washington circuit has also attracted interest on the Left, because they too live within the market, and have to pay their bills. At times like this, party politics goes into hibernation, or goes silent.
There are siren voices – for example from a Tisza-supporting politician – that characterise the reductions in household energy bills as an artificial construct, that emphasise its market-distorting effect, and that claim that as a result Hungarians aren’t learning to save money. In your opinion, will this statement – which I think was outrageous – affect the sober-minded majority in Hungarian society?
Firstly, left-wing liberal economists who say that this distorts the market, that it’s artificial and that it’s questionable how long it can be sustained, are right. So if our view of the world is one in which economic processes can prevail without political intervention, and that’s considered to be natural, then what we have now is unnatural, artificial, and indeed distorts what would happen in an economy without state intervention. But who thought – or thinks – that this is normal? I don’t think it’s normal. We maintain the state so that it can intervene in those areas in which the economy starts to work against the people. I don’t think this is artificial, but natural, normal. That’s why we have a state, that’s our job. Of course we have to intervene in such a way that’s sustainable for as long as possible. Because overall, there are not only households in the system, but also energy producers, traders, refiners, processors and many others; and overall the system must be acceptable to everyone, and we must ensure that it’s repeatedly renewed and maintained. This is possible. Liberals and leftists, however, either don’t believe this or don’t consider it right. Now, the infuriating statement that “This way Hungarians won’t learn to save”, which comes from the Tisza-ites. This is a manifestation of the real old, libby, Bolshie sense of superiority, in which the world is divided into “us” – the “smart ones” – and the people, who aren’t smart, and who must learn the meaning of smartness. And, according to them, it’s the job of the smart people – who are the leaders of the country – to lecture the people and force them to learn. All this describes the world in which leftist politicians like the Tisza-ites place themselves. To our national side and our national thinking that’s outrageous – the world isn’t like that. I could send an even stronger message to those who think this way about us, about people.
The highlight of this three-pronged approach was obviously the trip to Washington, which was the culmination of the grand strategy of connectivity. Or is that strategy never finished?
First, let’s examine whether the claim that this was the highlight is true, if so, why it was the highlight among all the others, and whether it’s part of a larger plan. It can be said that in terms of significance it far surpassed all the other meetings this year – mostly because President Trump took office in January, and this meeting took place sometime in November.
Yes.
So ten months passed without us meeting. But what’s the logical thing to happen? The big man’s elected, he takes office, and immediately everyone’s scrambling...
Scurrying around.
...pushing and trying to get in. I chose the opposite strategy, partly because I didn’t need to demonstrate that the new American president and I had a long-standing relationship. So we’d go to America when we could say exactly what we wanted from the Americans, after having prepared for it. This is why the visit to the US really stood out. Because it wasn’t just about what everyone here was talking about in connection with the visit, about them lifting the sanctions, the sanctions on Russian oil and natural gas. That was one thing, but we also signed an energy purchase agreement, a nuclear cooperation agreement – partly for technology procurement, partly for fuel procurement, partly for future joint nuclear investments in Hungary. We signed a military industry agreement. And we also signed an agreement on economic issues: on how American investments will come to Hungary, and if Hungary were to encounter financial problems – say, due to Brussels’ scheming – then how and by what means the United States could help us out. We translated this as a “financial shield”. So this is a very large package. In Hungarian diplomatic history it’s very rare to be able to negotiate a package with a major power containing four or five such serious elements. Now, if we put that aside and look at whether it fits into some larger strategy, then I can say that yes, it does. And this strategy, which had been secret until now, has now been revealed by the Americans, as they’ve written it down and published it. This is the document that many people are talking about. It’s the new US National Security Strategy, in which the Americans describe how they see the world, what they think is happening, what their interests are, and what means they intend to use to achieve them. And this already shows that this visit has turned the American–Hungarian relationship into a special one, because the Americans’ view of the world, of how to shape the world, and of what needs to be done in the world, is sharply different from – and even opposed to – what Europeans in Brussels think about these same issues. And this is a completely new situation in the Western world.
Just now you mentioned that this was a meeting of special significance in Hungarian–American diplomacy because of the “how”. On the plane flying back home, I asked you if you thought there was an English translation or version of the Hungarian expression “betyárbecsület” [outlaws’ code of honour]. You didn’t know the answer, neither did I, and I still haven’t found one. Could this concept be the basis for it? The fact that you stood by the American president even during Trump’s lowest popularity ratings?
In fact, before he was even President, when there was talk that he might become President, but everyone was betting on Hillary Clinton – if you remember those old days...
Yes, and they said that Orbán was betting the farm.
You could say that. Politics is still an art, and art involves intuition – which is more elegant than “betting the farm”, so let’s call it that.
I wasn’t quoting myself.
But there was more to it than that, because I already supported him back then – or rather, I spoke up for him, because I felt that changes were taking place in the world and we needed someone to man the barricades. And Hillary Clinton, who was an experienced woman with particular expertise in international affairs, wouldn’t be the right person for that. A completely different type of leader was needed, because a time was coming in which institutions – the familiar institutions of democracy, governments, parliaments, associations of this kind and that – wouldn’t be enough to bring about the necessary decisions. What we needed were single-minded leaders, serious men – even if they were women – who were tough, decisive, and not afraid of their own shadows. And it would be good if they came from outside the traditional elite circles, because if you come from within, then belonging to the establishment, to the elite, forces a certain way of thinking on you, since such people talk about things within a certain framework and have a certain pattern of behaviour. But when new things come along and things have to be done differently than earlier, you need someone who’s not afraid to upend the table. Not someone who just rearranges the pieces, but who takes them and says, “We’re not playing this game – we’re playing a new one.” And I knew, or saw, that President Trump – or rather he as the presidential candidate – had this in him. That’s what happened, and in this regard everything’s going according to our calculations – with all the negative and positive consequences of change. The positive consequences of his return far outweigh the negative ones – because, for example, imposing tariffs on European products isn’t good for Hungary. When weighing them up, that’s in the pan of bad things, but there are more numerous and more important things in the pan of good things.
When the Russo–Ukrainian war broke out, your political opponents constantly tried to downplay the danger of the situation, saying that all that was happening was that Viktor Orbán, true to form, was looking for a new enemy. Earlier it had been migrants, it had been George Soros, it had been COVID, and now the war was convenient for this. But I’ll go further. Right-wing public opinion, too, has – to use an ugly phrase – become complacent about the fact that there’s a war next door. Unfortunately, this is simply how modern people feel about it today, even while their minds tell them the danger is real, with countless shows, podcasts and news reports covering it. I’m sure you also feel that one characteristic of the media is that it can convey information quickly and directly, but when it comes from so many places, sometimes people don’t even turn it on or look at it.
It makes things seem normal.
Yes, and that’s terrible. Then NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte arrives, with breaking news, and makes a statement announcing to the world that now Russia’s target is Europe. And he says something else that’s very worrying: that we’re facing a war like the one our grandfathers and great-grandfathers fought. And something in us kicks in, a defensive reflex, because we’ve never heard anything like this before from someone in that position. How do you interpret Mark Rutte’s words?
First of all, to respond to the first part of the question, the war has been going on for almost four years now, and we don’t remember the beginning. Essentially, we have a period of war behind us that is as long as a world war – which is a long time. So it’s difficult to remember the beginning. But I remember my first battles, because when the war broke out, I immediately had a different assessment, an assessment that in several respects was different from the thoughts of many Western European leaders – but not all of them. At that time we weren’t as alone as we are now. At that time, for example, we were with the Germans. So at the very beginning of the war, the Hungarian and German positions were the same.
I don’t remember that either.
There was an EU summit in Versailles where the Germans spoke in favour of peace, and so did we. At the very beginning, the Germans said that they wouldn’t send any weapons. They said they’d send helmets. And then later they said, “Okay, if we really have to, we’ll send non-lethal weapons.” But no one remembers that now. Then the Germans also said that sanctions on natural gas and oil would never happen. But then the Americans and the other European Union countries pushed them into the war. But it’s important to remember that at the outset Hungary wasn’t standing alone in opposing the war, because, as I’ve mentioned, at the beginning many of us – including the Germans – were on the side of peace. And from there, the chain of events has moved forward to the point where the NATO Secretary General is now alarming us with talk of a world war reminiscent of the era of our fathers and grandfathers. So we’ve come a long way, but because we’re caught up in the hustle and bustle of everyday life, we can’t see this process from the outside. Let’s say that it’s my job to see it, so I can recall it. Well, the first question is whether Mark Rutte knows what he’s talking about; because we can’t rule out the possibility that he doesn’t know what he’s talking about, that he’s talking nonsense, that he doesn’t understand the weight of historical analogies, and so on. This is difficult to assume. We’re well acquainted with the former Dutch prime minister, who’s now the Secretary General of NATO. He has a habit of saying strange things, which we Hungarians remember particularly well – as he’s said infuriating, hurtful and annoying things about Hungary. Fortunately, that’s now behind us. But he could never be accused of being a stupid man. So we can’t assume that he was unaware of the weight of his words. What’s really alarming is that it’s not just about war, but that it evoked memories of the ruined streets of Budapest during World War II, the sixty-day siege and the many atrocities as the front swept through Hungary. We saw the bombing of all our industrial cities, the deportation of Jews, and then the forced expulsion of ethnic Germans. So all of this comes to mind after such a statement by the NATO Secretary General. Perhaps these images don’t come to his mind, but the statement is still serious, because it contradicts what the Americans are saying. So if we suddenly distance ourselves from the horrors of war and look at this statement as being a European position that’s completely different from – and even contrary to – the American position, which they disagree with, then we see unfolding before us the new world we talked about at the beginning of today’s interview: a situation in which something new is emerging, something that didn’t exist before. Because we’ve never seen the United States, which is one pillar of NATO, and the countries belonging to the EU – which is the other pillar – say such sharply divergent things on military and security issues, with America wanting peace and Europe wanting war. We’ve seen situations in which, for example, it was necessary to go into Afghanistan or Iraq, and then the Americans said, “Well, who’s coming?” And then a coalition of the willing was formed, and some went, while others didn’t. But there was never a situation in which one said “A” and another said “B” about a war in progress in our neighbourhood. So it’s clear that the new world unfolding before our eyes carries with it the possibility of American–European conflicts. So the question is not what I think about the NATO Secretary General’s statement, but what the American president thinks. And therefore, to put it a little more strongly, it’s about whether he’ll still have a job the day after tomorrow. But perhaps I’d add one comment about the war. Of course we’re talking about the past now, but next week there will be this European Union summit, and in the meantime one of the war’s important sub-issues on the table – an increasingly important sub-issue – is the matter of the frozen Russian assets. Russian foreign exchange reserves are held in specialised financial institutions in various European countries. Hungary also keeps its own foreign exchange reserves, which are larger than at any previous time in history, in various places – for example, at the same Belgian company as the Russians. And now those assets are going to be seized; until now, they’ve only been frozen, but now they want to use them to finance the Ukrainians in this war. This is perhaps a more significant event than is commonly acknowledged, as this didn’t even happen during World War II. If I remember my history lessons correctly, even the seized German assets were only used at the end of the war, not during the war. Now, however, this is happening. This is a declaration of war. So I have to say that we shouldn’t misunderstand or underestimate this: the seizure and subsequent use of Russia’s national currency reserves in order to assist and provide financial support to a party at war with Russia is itself a declaration of war. I don’t know what the consequences will be, but this is much more serious than it might seem at first glance. Because it appears to be an economic issue, but it isn’t: it’s a direct move towards entering the war.
And the Belgian prime minister immediately sensed that he would be the first target.
What’s the situation? Since this is completely illegal, there’s a serious risk that the Russians will want to assert their rights under international law, and demand satisfaction. And then someone will have to take responsibility. They’ve contracted with a Belgian company, which can of course say “It’s the EU”, and so on and so forth; but in reality the Russians will win their lawsuit against the Belgian company. And we’re talking about a business of such magnitude – the management of national foreign exchange reserves is such a large-scale financial transaction – that it could fundamentally unsettle the Belgian economy. And if I remember the figures correctly, it seems that this Belgian company called Euroclear also has 16 billion in Russia – assets there that the Russians also immediately froze. So if they touch the assets here, they’ll lose them there. And on top of that, it’s an extremely complicated matter, because behind this money there are also transactions with other countries. It’s like a sweater: if I pull this strand of wool and start unravelling it, it won’t only be the Belgian colours that come out of the sweater, but suddenly I’ll also unravel the strands of several other countries’ flags.
Digital civic circles. Has enough time passed to take stock? If I may, let me share my perception. I’m sure there were many different undertakings involved in this whole thing, but one of the most symbolic ones seems to have been very successful. This is that ordinary Hungarian citizens with right-wing sentiments shouldn’t feel that if they’re attacked, they won’t be helped by their elected politicians, their favourite media journalists on the Right, or their neighbours, relatives, or friends. Before these circles existed what I’d noticed was that these people felt that it was possible that we had the majority on our side, but something had to be done because of the loud and arrogant voices in the online space, which effectively silenced people on the Right – ordinary people. And I’ll say it again: there could have been more to it, but for me this was one of the most important things. And I can see that these people have gained self-confidence and are using it; and even those who aren’t compulsive communicators – who aren’t humorous and can’t come up with a quick retort – can support such a page with a like. And so this has resulted in a kind of consolidation, so that these people aren’t scattered, but are together. I see this as the most important thing.
I think it’s important, so I agree with your question, if I may say so. I also think it’s extremely important. When a person has to fight alone, it’s not the same as when they can count on their fellows standing beside them; it’s a different mental state. If we look at the matter from a different or broader perspective, it’s easy to understand why we started it. I was the one who got it going, and you only need to ask me about it to get an answer. It was a feeling that had built up inside me over many years, after I myself had fallen into or drifted along with the misguided or distorted way of thinking, according to which the digital world isn’t our world. And then I thought, “Why not? It could be ours, couldn’t it? The digital world belongs to everyone.” So the fact that the leftists have taken it over is because this tool perhaps fits better with their philosophy of life: they’re more nihilistic, while we stand for something. I think that there are more serious and sacred things in our lives than there are in theirs. They mock far more things than we do. And the whole online world in Hungary has brought with it a kind of flippancy, a certain style: foul language, impudence, disrespect. This is something that’s aroused cultural aversion in people towards the whole thing. But then I realised that this isn’t the case everywhere in the world. Of course, leftists generally find it easier to navigate this space, and shameless irresponsibility is more their world – they revel in it. Our people like to know who said what, why they said it, and they want people to take responsibility for their opinions. “Where’s this person?” That’s how we tend to react. But this phenomenon didn’t take hold anywhere else as harshly as it did in Hungary. And then I came to the conclusion that we should break the fundamental taboo or thesis that it’s their world, and not ours: let it be ours too – especially after public discourse moved over there with an increasing level of noise, because the readership of print newspapers disappeared, and television had begun to disappear... So you can see that the future, the discourses of the future, will be there rather than in the spaces where we are. And if we don’t want to be left out of this, then we have to say that “This isn’t yours, it’s ours too. Not only ours, but ours was well.” And this is why we have to go there. We can adapt this to our image or our philosophy, and on this medium we can talk differently. What can be distributed isn’t only pornography, but also beautiful romantic films; and it’s not only a space for political ranting, but also for worthwhile dialogue. So it’s true that there’s a bad side to everything in the online space, but there could also be a good counterpart – or at least parts that are positive. And this will only happen if we go there, because we’ll bring these good things with us. And this is why I thought I’d issue a call, an address, and invite the honourable Hungarian civic, conservative world of the Right to join us in an online conquest of the homeland: to pack our things, pack our tents, harness our oxen like the ancient conquerors, venture into the online space, declare our presence, and start living there. And if we’re good, if we do this well, then we’ll occupy ever more space, and there will be ever more of us. And it’s just the same in everyday life, where there are also arrogant people – not only in the online space, but also at work and in society generally. But they’re usually rejected, or after a while they’re ostracised, or their voices fade away. So we don’t allow these bad things to take over our lives – why should we allow them to take over the online space? And then we set out, and it turned out that it was possible. Two: from the start we’re not alone. So those who had been fighting as solitary guerrillas suddenly got regular, supportive, relief troops. It’s also turned out that the owners of these technical tools, of Facebook, will limit the space for public discourse; and they can ban many things, but they can’t ban people’s conversations with one another. And if there are many of us on there, talking loudly to one another, that will have the greatest impact on the future of Hungarian society. And I’m not just talking about the election, but also about political public life, regardless of the election. So, a number of things like this have come about. This is a civic movement, and it undoubtedly touches on political issues, as it’s a public, civic platform and world. It should remain that way: it shouldn’t be drawn into party politics. It’s good to be outside, to organise from the outside, and basically to open up space for those values, people and ideas that don’t view the world from a traditional liberal-leftist perspective.
If we look at the Digital Civic Circles’ roadshow, which is attended by live audiences in various cities, it’s essentially flesh-and-blood reality brought online, and then brought back to flesh-and-blood reality – and I think it works very well. Has there ever been a time in Hungarian politics when a challenger to the current government has taken it upon themselves – like a five-year-old throwing a tantrum – to organise their own events in the same cities on the same days? Or should we throw away everything we’ve seen since 1990 and not worry about what happened before, because a completely different situation has arisen?
I wouldn’t call it childish; it’s just what they are. But before I say anything more profound about this, let me reflect on the fact that it’s online to real life, and back online. When only liberals and leftists use the online space, it’s often accompanied by a kind of loneliness, a kind of isolation. So they’re not just present in the online space: they often live there. That’s a big difference! We go there sometimes. We also have real lives, we have communities: religious, family, this, that, and the other. So we’re also part of a real, offline civic world. For us, the online space doesn’t replace the real-world space. This is why we can only be present in the online space by going on, coming off, going back, and so on. We don’t want to leave behind and give up that real network of relationships.
One explanation for our disadvantage is that we don’t spend as much time there.
Yes, but now there are many of us, and that will even out; but the point is that we don’t live there, but the online space has become part of our lives. And that’s a very, very big difference. And I think it’s better that way. So I think that overall this triggers healthier socio-psychological processes in us than what we see on the other side. But maybe I’m biased, and if I’m wrong, I apologise – I mean to the leftists. Childishness. I’m not surprised by this at all. It brings us back to philosophical differences. Why do we come together? Because we enjoy one another’s company.
We love this way of life...
Yes, we enjoy one another’s company. We love being together. It’s nice when we’re together. If we do it right, the Digital Civic Circles’ programme of travelling around the country will become even better. There are artists, serious people, local people and national figures, athletes and musicians – and now even a former president. So the overall quality is high, and it’s good to be there. That’s why we come together. What’s more, we reinforce each other’s belief that we’re on the right track: many of us think the same way about difficult issues, and that strengthens us. That’s who we are. What does the other side do? They provoke. So they don’t follow us, they provoke. They come together to provoke someone else. They don’t like being together or like one another. That’s not what it’s about: it’s a different world, they come together to wreck our joy, to provoke. This stems from the old and well-known differences between these two attitudes to life and philosophies of life.
So you’ve explained that I was wrong to expect it to be some manoeuvre or trick, whereby we’d announce from here, from the Right, I don’t know, Szombathely, just to give an example – but then it wouldn’t happen. Because then...
Yes. We’d be down there too.
Yes. Okay. On my show, when you were staying at “Hotel Lentulai”, we talked about how a new archetype of Fidesz politician is emerging – one that’s capable of meeting the challenges of the modern age. To quote you from two years ago in Kötcse, it’s the duty of every politician to develop the ability to say what needs to be said accurately in five minutes into a microphone held under their nose – even without preparation. Roughly at the same time as the Digital Civic Circles are taking off, I’m also seeing a much larger number of Fidesz politicians travelling around the country. I once told one of them that I was seeing them more often, and they said no, it was always like that. But I don’t want to believe that, so I’m sure that the whole thing is more intense.
I think that’s the case.
So I’m not just experiencing an optical illusion.
No. No, this change is real.
Even those who are, let’s say, less skilled in this kind of relaxed, direct communication can pick up solid experience. Where does the Fidesz team stand on this now?
When a methodology changes, it requires new skills, and you have to adapt. This is true in everything. So if you watch a football match from the 1950s or 1960s and compare it to one from today, you’ll see the difference. It’s the same game, and yet it’s different. And I’m sure it’s the same with everything else. So if you want to stay in the game, these new tools require new skills, and you have to develop them yourself. And either you succeed or you don’t. Some people don’t succeed, by the way. That doesn’t mean we throw them overboard, because the world of politics or public life isn’t only on the stage – there are also people behind the scenes. We’re talking here now, but there are some people working here to make sure we can be heard and seen – and it’s the same in politics. There will always be a need for experts, a need for smart people. Someone who’s only good at writing, not speaking, is still valuable, and we need them. Even if someone can only speak about things in detail and cannot summarise, and isn’t useful in front of the camera, their knowledge is still valuable. In such cases, when changes requiring new skills are needed, it’s the task of managers – and I include myself here – to find a new place for everyone so that overall we don’t lose energy, but gain it. I do this all the time. So, as we’ve heard, those who have remained standing – there are areas where we’ve made changes – have become much better at these skills than they were before. They’re more organised, sharper, clearer and easier to understand. And that’s good. This is what politics will be like over the next ten years. Then technology will surely change again, we don’t yet know how, and then we’ll have to learn new things. Our profession is the most innovative. So if you look at all the professions, from financial investments to academia to politics, the most changeable, innovative, and competitive slice of the world is the one we call public life. There are rapid changes here that aren’t seen in other areas. I have to buckle down and do what needs to be done in order to keep up with the youngsters. It’s not at all easy for me either.
Let me cite the case of János Pócs. He’s a 62-year-old Fidesz politician who’s gone viral in the online space. When I watch his videos I end up in tears of laughter. He’s so original, and I can see that no one else has written them for him. Fidesz politicians have noticed this too, and I once overheard one of them saying that he’d like to be like Pócs. How could he do that? You can’t be like that.
Of course. It’s like my sport again, where there are trained footballers and natural footballers. There are natural poets and trained poets. These are different things. So that’s how it is. God gives some people talent and others just diligence. You can reach a certain level – and even achieve great results – with diligence alone; but when talent and diligence are combined, it’s unbeatable. That’s the situation with Pócs. In this new situation, in this new environment, my fellow Member of Parliament is unbeatable. If I had to be the same type of natural...
I couldn’t do it.
I couldn’t. Of course not. He’s better than me. That’s how it is.
Okay, so the exploitation of originality is available, it exists.
Yes, I think that applies to the entire online world, about which I have many culturally pessimistic observations. I’m also concerned about what will happen to humanity, or the future of our children; but there are also good things that I see in these changes. This, for example. So what’s fake won’t survive. So the digital world somehow conveys information directly from you to the viewer, and if you lie, in two seconds – I’m exaggerating, in thirty seconds – you’ll be found out, they’ll switch off, and you’ll become irrelevant. And János Pócs MP and others are effective because they don’t lie, they are what we see, that’s how it is. He thinks something, he says it, it’s natural. The artificiality that I think makes politics more difficult rather than easier falls away. So this, for example, is a positive development of digital change.
If we look at recent opinion poll figures, there’s a fairly unanimous opinion, not only among institutes on the Right, that Fidesz is gaining in strength. But now even the institutes on the other side are perhaps less inclined to throw around big numbers, and in some places we’re already seeing acknowledgments – even if it’s like pulling teeth – that Fidesz is indeed growing stronger. I suspect you don’t necessarily see it that way, but if we look back at the year before every election year, how do the ruling parties fare in those comparisons? Is there any trend we can build on now? Was there a little fluctuation, then a strengthening, and then, to use sports terminology, will timing decide everything anyway? And then we’d say “Let’s calm down, dear colleagues, nothing’s wrong.” So how does the Right stand on this now?
I know from experience. Six months before an election, the Left really does throw all its available resources into the fray, including its intellectuals, artists, journalists, influencers and pollsters. And they push, and push, and push and push. We won the last election with a two-thirds majority, yet five or six months earlier the talk was that we’d lose by two-thirds and that the sky was falling in. Then what happened happened. The first experience is that the lefties somehow quickly organise their movement before we’re able to and can speak with one voice. And this creates the feeling that they’re strong and we’re weaker. Then it turns out that this isn’t the case. The second thing is that there’s cacophony six months before the election – or three or four months before, as is the case now. So, the election campaign or election period is like separating the wheat from the chaff, blowing away what doesn’t belong there; and by the time we get to the election, only the essence – the important things – remain, and the rest is gone. And, after all, isn’t the election about whom we entrust with the big, important decisions that will determine our lives for the next four years? And what will those we entrust with this decision-making power do with it? Meanwhile, we’re surrounded by a world that’s sometimes conducive to experimentation and sometimes fraught with enormous risks, as is the case now. And then experience and security become more important than experimentation. So as we move towards the election, it’s increasingly about the essentials: governability, responsibility, competence, reliability, predictability and security. And I think this works in our favour, because we have fifteen years behind us – which of course in one sense is a disadvantage, because no one can work perfectly, and there will always be something in the work to find fault with. So the opposition will always have more to find fault with over fifteen years than, say, over four years. So if you’re in power for a long time, it gives rise to a lot of criticism – sometimes justified criticism. That’s the downside. But on the other hand, it gives you a chance to prove your seriousness, that you can be counted on, to prove your loyalty, that you’re on the side of the people, that you’re brave, that you don’t run away, and that you stand up for them. Now, if an opposition comes along, we don’t know if it will be like that or not. Right now, it doesn’t look like it. But we know what we’re like. And I think that as we approach the election, it’s often said that the ability to govern is becoming increasingly important. And I can say with certainty that this process does happen. We’re moving in that direction now, and that works in our favour. So, in light of my experience with elections, I’d rather look at things from this perspective, and less in terms of the poll numbers.
Is the ruling party’s goal for the remaining months to win over the so-called “uncertain” voters?
Are there any uncertain voters? It’s a well-established and accepted idea that there are uncertain voters.
I still use that term.
Yes.
Indeed!
But are there any?
In fact, I’d say with great confidence that they’ll probably decide this one too, because that’s what we saw back then. Won’t that be the case?
But what are they uncertain about? When we use this word, I don’t think that people are uncertain within themselves. They know exactly what they expect. The moment hasn’t yet come when their expectations and perspectives on life and public life coincide with the moment of decision. But they know exactly what they expect, they just haven’t dealt with it yet: they’re not uncertain – they just haven’t got there yet. It’s not important to them yet, they don’t have a decision yet. For us, as journalists or politicians, it’s already here, it’s already knocking on our door – but not for them. I think people know exactly what they think about the important things in life, and they also know what to think about their own situation. They’re quite well informed about international affairs, as you showed us in your first question here; and they also know what they want. This just hasn’t been translated into a political decision yet. It will come. When the election comes, they’ll look around, see what’s there, recognise what they know and don’t know, think about this and that, and then decide. They’re not uncertain – they just haven’t got there yet. They’ll get there, and as usual, I think they’ll vote for security, governability, predictability, seriousness and experience. That’s my hope.
I accept that. Let me rephrase the question: Is it possible to win back a voter who used to be “sometimes yes, sometimes no”, sometimes leaning Right, but who’s now a mesmerised Tisza supporter? Is there enough time for that? Because it seems as if many of them are under some kind of spell. Can this spell be broken?
That may be the right word, but perhaps I’d use another one: they’re in a state of agitation. In politics there’s a kind of knowledge, a kind of leeway, a space, an opportunity: if something is wrong – and there’s always something that’s wrong – you can whip up emotions and use them to turn voters against your political opponents. This is a well-known method: it’s taught, there are textbooks on it, you can read about it. And the Left does this regularly – when they’re in opposition, that’s basically all they do. They always immediately raise questions of democracy, and they do so in order to stir up emotions, saying that if they’re not in government, there’s no democracy. And then they put all kinds of other issues into the realm of emotion, injecting them with emotional energy. But this passes. It can’t be timed to coincide with election day. These are things that work for a day or two, or three. So I don’t think it’s a spell, but rather emotion or passion that’s pushing itself ahead of rational thinking. But as we get closer to the election, as people come on board, and we have to decide what will happen in the next four years, then what you call a spell, and I call passion...
I’ve been very kind.
...will slip away, move aside, or slide away, and the truly important issues will come to the fore. I think this is to be expected; this is what I’ve seen in Hungary up to now. The people choose – not all peoples are like this, but the Hungarians are. I think Hungarians like to say bold things but make cautious decisions.
So you’re telling me that in the free elections since 1990, no matter what happened before, on election day the deciding factor was always reason, not emotion.
That’s how I remember it.
Even if now we feel very strongly that there is a politics of revenge?
But we can look at this in its entirety. In 1990 people decided they’d had enough of communism, that the communists should leave, the Soviets should go home, and then there should be some kind of Hungarian government. In 1994 they thought that the expectations they’d tied to or associated with the change of system were primarily economic, and those expectations hadn’t been met. They developed the feeling that it would be better if the old experts came back – even if their pedigree was questionable. Then, in 1998, it turned out that this had resulted in the Bokros Package [of austerity measures], and they said that things wouldn’t work out that way, and so it would be better to give the young people a chance. And so instead of Bokros they brought us in. Then in 2002 Péter Medgyessy said that the boys were actually doing a good job, but that he’d be able to do a better one, and people believed him. That was also a rational decision. Then he was ousted, the 2006 election came, and it wasn’t emotions that decided in favour of Gyurcsány and his party, but rather that people somehow had more confidence in them than in Fidesz, which had been voted out four years earlier. That’s how it is. In 2010 they said, “Well, now there’s a limit to everything, this is terrible, enough is enough.” And they gave us a two-thirds majority. And since then, they’ve always said, “Of course, this isn’t the perfection we’d like, there are mistakes here, the Government could handle many issues more intelligently and skilfully than it’s doing, but overall, this is what we wanted, isn’t it? Well, it’s still good to have low taxes, to support families, to send the IMF and the banks home, to involve multinationals in public spending, to be on the side of peace instead of war, to not let migrants in, to not let our children be taught such woke nonsense – well, that’s good, isn’t it?” And that’s why they voted for us again and again. I think that behind every decision, behind every election decision, ultimately one can decipher a decisive, rational, reasonable decision or consideration.
Let’s swallow a bitter pill, Prime Minister. Szőlő Street...
Let’s spit it out instead.
It’s a matter of perspective. When I look at this situation and try to convince myself that I’m a rationally thinking Hungarian citizen, regardless of my political preferences, I see three things with regard to the Szőlő Street reformatory: I see a brothel; I see a video recording of a teacher who, to put it mildly, overstepped his authority – at least according to my perception; and I see and read about residents who can be called anything but little saints and cute little lambs. Here are young people who are seasoned, despite their young age, and considered to be miscreants.
No, they’re juvenile criminals.
That’s right.
Exactly.
I don’t have to be a Fidesz supporter to see it that way, nor does anyone else have to be a DK supporter to see it differently. What’s happening in public opinion when in this situation – based on these perceptions – some people can only think in a Fidesz way on one side of the scale, while others can only think in an opposition way on the other side? How can this whole thing be resolved? I dare to hope that there are normal people on the other side too…
We’ll see.
...people who think intelligently. Why do they see things differently than I do?
It’s not easy to understand. So, as you’ve described the situation, it seemed quite complicated even to me – and I’m familiar with the issue. So it’s not easy to understand. I’ll try to approach it from the Government’s perspective. In every modern society, including Hungary, there are children who don’t have parents – either because they were bad parents and the child welfare system took the children away from them, or because they’d died, or because they’d abandoned a child at birth. And so there are tens of thousands of children who need to be taken care of. And after the communists dismantled the churches and the earlier civil organisations which, even without the state, as part of their mission had looked after these children in various charitable, donation-based ways, those structures no longer exist. As a result, in Hungary this is something the state has to do. So this is a state responsibility. We have to take care of children who, for whatever reason, don’t have parents. Now the state is solving this somehow, with a network of adoptive parents, institutions, and so on. And the state must ensure that only suitable people become adoptive parents, that they meet the necessary conditions for adoptive parenting, and that they check on the children from time to time to make sure that everything’s okay. Those who can’t be placed with adoptive parents are kept in institutions, which must operate normally; and this is the responsibility of the state, which must supervise them, and so on. This is a matter for the state. Szőlő Street, which you’re referring to, is a special institution. It houses juvenile offenders. They’ve all committed crimes, mostly serious ones – including murder. So it’s basically a type of prison. There are separate prisons for juveniles, and there are reformatories, but this is essentially the same thing. It’s a tough place. Everyone knows that there are prisoners and there are wardens there. It’s a tough place. What we saw, and what upset us – I think both you and me – was that in a very difficult environment, in such a prison-like situation, a difficult situation was resolved by a warden, an educator, in a way that’s unacceptable, and even constitutes a crime. And it’s on camera, so there’s no way anyone can talk their way out of it. Even a young criminal can’t be treated the way this warden treated the detainee. That’s unacceptable, no question about it! And the state will investigate these cases, prosecute them and punish them. There are five such institutions, by the way, before anyone thinks that the country is full of such institutions. We have five such correctional institutions. And in recent days, the Minister of the Interior has appointed police officers to head all five educational institutions. I’ve had to transfer the supervision of these institutions from social administration to the police and the penal system, where there’s more experience in how to operate juvenile prisons and juvenile correctional institutions. And I expect the police to restore order there and reassure the public that nothing like this can happen in an institution supervised by the police, even if the recording we saw was made perhaps ten years ago...
Yes. Aren’t you surprised that this whole thing is ripe for political exploitation? There was the now-defunct “Uncle Zsolti” affair, and, looking at the whole story, one gets the feeling – and in this case maybe I’m a believer in conspiracy theories – that this was a planned thing, that they’d decided when and in what period to throw the story out.
It can never be ruled out, of course. Look, it can’t be ruled out. Politics is an organised world. So even behind seemingly spontaneous actions, it may later turn out that there are connections and plans – but that’s not important here. Right now, everyone’s doing their job. I don’t want to say a bad word about the opposition right now. The opposition is there to prove to the people that the Government is incapable of governing, and thus to keep the Government under pressure and force it to perform better – which is, after all, the whole point of political competition. So, overall, that isn’t objectionable. Their job is to say, “Here’s an area – admittedly not the whole of the country’s administration, but a small, important, and emotionally significant area – where the Government isn’t performing well.” Their job is to point that out. The fact that they exploit it and are cunning in the process – well, that’s life. We have only one task: to ensure that the police guarantee that all Hungarians – including the young criminals entrusted to us and held in our custody – receive humane treatment and a chance to return to a law-abiding, normal life. This is successful less often than it should be.
As the year draws to a close, Prime Minister, tell me some things that you remember from this completely crazy and – how shall I put it – eventful year: one thing you feel is lacking, an unpleasant surprise, a piece of self-criticism, and one thing that you’ll remember fondly.
I never engage in self-criticism, because I don’t want to deprive the opposition of its bread and butter.
This is the second time I’ve run into that.
Yes, and I’ve already said that anyway I don’t do two jobs for the price of one.
A sense of loss?
But if I have to say something painful and uncomfortable, then I’ll say the 96th minute.
Oh, my God! Okay...
That hit home.
And something good?
The good news is that a realisation first occurred in the Western cultural sphere in Hungary, back in 2010: the idea that the world will change and a new order will be created, and nothing will remain as it was, and the pecking order of nations will be transformed, with some going down, others rising, and this change being inevitable. Our new constitution was born out of this idea. So the good news is that we’ve been preparing for many years for what’s happening here before our eyes, and what will happen in the coming years. And this is why Hungary will ultimately be one of the biggest – if not the biggest – winners from this great transformation, which now seems so chaotic.
Thank you very much for making yourself available to us and welcoming us to the Carmelite Theatre. It’s a truly distinguished venue and very beautiful.
Thank you for coming.
Thank you very much to our audience for your attention! And to you, Prime Minister, I wish you a peaceful Advent and a pleasant holiday season.
I wish you all a blessed holiday season and a Merry Christmas.