Máté Gerhardt: Hello everyone! We’re conducting a special Patrióta year-end interview with the Prime Minister, who’s here with us in the studio. Prime Minister, welcome! Welcome, and thank you for accepting our invitation.
Thank you for having me.
And before we dive right in, I must mention that this will be an unusual interview. It will consist of two parts. First, we’ll discuss current political affairs, and then we’ll broaden our perspective a little and examine the issues in this context and interpretation of the world.
Bring it on.
Let’s start at the beginning. On Saturday you said that we’re in for a very turbulent week in Brussels, that we should buckle up our seatbelts, and that there will be a fight. These are very strong words. Is the conflict with Brussels really that serious? Do you expect such a tough battle?
There’s a lot of money on the table. So there’s 230 billion euros on the table, which is the amount of frozen Russian assets that European leaders have made it their goal to confiscate and hand over to the Ukrainians – which, in our view, is tantamount to a declaration of war, and which will plunge the European Union into serious trouble. It will drag us into serious economic trouble, which will cause major problems and push us further down the path to war, bringing us closer and closer to actual armed conflict. This must be prevented; but I see little chance of that happening, because there are only three or four of us who disagree with this – despite the fact that previously the Germans and others, larger countries, said that it was out of the question. But I see that they’re crossing the Rubicon. And if we can’t prevent it, which is more than likely, then we’ll have to find a way to stay out of it – which won’t be easy either.
How can we opt out of this when the leadership in Brussels says that all EU Member States must adhere to it, and that it can only be achieved together? How can we opt out of this?
According to the EU’s current rules, up to now such a decision – whether or not to freeze Russian state assets – was subject to unanimous decision-making. So that’s been the rule so far, and from every relevant section of the European Union’s legal system it follows that such decisions must be taken unanimously. Since there’s a risk that we – and possibly one or two other countries – won’t support this, and will lift the freeze on these assets, a legal leapfrog has been performed to change this, and from now on a two-thirds majority will suffice. This has happened. So we’ve gone through all that. Until now, a unanimous decision had to be made every six months on the freezing of Russian assets, but this has been removed. The question now is, okay, we don’t need to make a decision every six months to extend the freeze, but what should we do with the assets? This can only be decided unanimously. But it’s quite possible that during the debate they’ll say that a unanimous decision isn’t necessary, as they did in the previous case, and they’ll switch to a two-thirds majority system. In this event Hungary won’t be able to prevent the decision, and we’ll have to figure out how to avoid its consequences. Most of all, we should avoid exposure to Russian retaliation.
Yes, but then, from this point on, if they really say that Brussels will confiscate these Russian assets, get its hands on this frozen money, the most important question is whether then Europe could officially go to war – or whether we should expect a very harsh, strong Russian response, a countermeasure.
The first thing we need to acknowledge is that there’s no Western unity on this, because the Americans are opposed to it and they’re saying so openly – since one of the items on the agenda in the US–Russian negotiations is precisely the fate of this sum. And they didn’t write that it would be given to the Europeans, but that it would be put into two American–Russian asset funds, and that the income generated would be used for certain purposes. So the Americans and Russians are pulling this amount towards themselves, saying that it belongs to the Russians, they have control over it, and it can be included in the peace settlement, helping to promote peace. The Europeans are saying: “No, this is Russian money, but from now on it’s ours, and we won’t give it up.” So there’s a transatlantic divide here, with the Europeans and Americans openly seeking completely different directions on this issue. And here we are, saying that we’re members of the European Union, we disagree with this, and we think that the Americans are right: this money should be left where it is and allowed to be used by the Americans and Russians for the sake of peace-making.
Yes, but something many of our viewers don’t understand – and we’ve received many questions asking what you think on this – is the motivation of the Brussels elite in this matter. Because it doesn’t seem logical that they’d support something that they know will have very serious consequences – yet they seem to be flying blind, saying “What will be, will be”, and “After us the deluge, we’ll still keep doing this, even if it doesn’t end well.”
They’re chasing their money – that’s my short answer to your question. So they’ve already spent more than 100 billion euros on this war. In programmes like this they’ve told their voters, “Dear German, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and French citizens, this war won’t cost you a penny.”
Did the European public believe this?
Not only did they believe it, they applauded it. The entire Western European liberal press wrote about it, saying that this is a war that won’t cost us any money, because the money to be sent to the Ukrainians will come from Russian assets, from the exploitation of those assets. When this idea that it won’t cost people anything is debunked – when it turns out that after all it will hit their pockets, or lighten them, because that’s where the money’s being taken from, that their pockets will suffer from what’s been spent so far, that they’ll have to pay for that and for what lies ahead – then this could lead to an explosive realisation in Western Europe and immediately lead to the downfall of several governments. Therefore, now that the money’s already been spent, it’s necessary to somehow obtain the funds to cover this from somewhere other than taxpayers’ pockets. That’s Russian assets. And if they can’t obtain that, some governments will be in big trouble.
Yes, but in this debate who else can we count on? You’ve said what Hungary’s position is. Are there any other countries, any other leaders who share our position?
First of all, it must be made clear that everything that’s happening is unlawful. The fact that Hungary’s being deprived of its right to resist – when this is a matter requiring unanimity, but Hungary is unable to defend its own interests – is something that violates all the European Union’s legal principles. Therefore, as soon as these decisions are published in writing, the next morning we’ll turn to the European Court of Justice and try to enforce our claims through legal means. Of course, this won’t succeed tomorrow morning, if it succeeds at all, and I wouldn’t bet too much money on the European Court of Justice’s decisions being favourable to us; but anyway, we’ll do what we have to do. The Slovaks are clearly saying what we’re saying; and we’re on the same page as the incoming Czech prime minister, if I’ve correctly understood his opinion. The Belgian prime minister is holding out for now, as his country would be the one suffering the most serious financial consequences, with a large part of the frozen Russian assets being deposited in Belgium and with Belgian companies. International law prohibits this, so if the Russians won a lawsuit related to it, and it would only be a matter of time before they did, at that moment the Belgians would have to repay this amount to the Russians. That would bring down the Belgian economy.
Yes, but it’s clear that Europe is once again at a crossroads, and so is the EU leadership. This EU summit could have a very good or a very bad outcome. In your opinion, what’s the best-case scenario for Hungary, and what’s the one in which we’d be the losers?
Europe’s at a crossroads, and not only in terms of this summit. I don’t want to get ahead of myself, but in fact since the American president took office we’ve been living with a process in which the American part of the West and the European part of the West have been following different paths. Western Europe continues to adhere to the global or globalist-liberal path, while the Americans have announced a new era: the American position is the end of globalism and the dawn of the era of nations. The American position is favourable to us. So we also think that the time has come for the era of nations, the age of nations, to arrive – and in fact we’ve been preparing for this since 2010. So for us it would be good if the European leaders were to see that light and, at the end of the debate, say that American peace efforts should be supported – and that even the issue of Russian assets should be subordinated to the American peace effort. That would be the best outcome.
And do you see any chance of them seeing the light?
We still have three days left.
So miracles can happen in that time. On Sunday you posted the “Brussels”, the 1.6 million national consultation forms that have been returned. In this debate, how will you use the opinions that people have sent back? Will this carry weight with the decision-makers in Brussels?
This is what keeps me going. So if I didn’t have this behind me, I wouldn’t be able to rely on it, and the Hungarian position would have been swept aside long ago. So if Brussels managed to create the impression that there’s one man, one stubborn prime minister, standing in the way of European justice, or if they managed to create the impression that there’s a stupid government standing in the way of the smart European position, then it would only be a matter of time before they crushed me and crushed the Hungarian government. They can’t do that on any single issue, because behind us we always have Hungary. They would have crushed us long ago on the issue of migration. They can’t crush us, because there was a referendum in Hungary, and I can say, “Dear Brusselite comrades, this is the position of the Hungarian people, and I shall not budge an inch from it.” And they understand this immediately, because if they were in this situation, they wouldn’t be able to move either – except that they’ve never asked their people what they think about migration. Or in child protection cases, where we also resist their desire to thoroughly re-educate our children. They could say that this is a government with medieval, pro-family conservative views, and that it’s not worth paying much attention to it; but this isn’t the case, because there was a referendum in Hungary in which people said that they didn’t want our children’s minds to be reprogrammed, and I can defend our position. The same applies to EU membership for Ukraine. It isn’t that the Hungarian government is blocking Ukraine’s EU membership: the Hungarians have said that they don’t want to be in a union with the Ukrainians, period – good day to you! That’s a completely different position, and there’s nothing that can be done about it. There’s no point in them trying to convince me, because that makes no sense. There’s only one thing they can do: they have to accept it.
Yes, it’s also clear that the kind of dissatisfaction you’ve mentioned in relation to the EU leadership is becoming increasingly apparent. I’m thinking of the farmers’ protests, with Hungarian farmers also going to Brussels, and for a long time they’ve been organising very serious protests, precisely because of the distribution of agricultural subsidies.
This is a complicated issue. First of all, there are the complaints and grievances of rural areas, rural Europeans, and those who make their living from agriculture, due to previous decisions that are currently in force. The victims of the whole greening programme are farmers and rural Europe in general. Now some energy decisions are being proposed that will also hurt rural areas the most. But what’s triggering this protest the most is that at this summit we’ll be discussing the European Union’s next seven-year budget. And farmers can see, quite clearly, that their money’s being cut. So over the next seven years the European Union wants to spend much less money on agriculture and rural areas than it’s done so far, than it’s spent so far. How do these figures add up? The total amount of the next seven-year budget, which we’re currently discussing, will be reduced by 10 per cent to repay the financial fund set up after the coronavirus, which is called “NextGeneration”. This was a loan, which Member States had access to – or rather some did, because we weren’t allowed such access. Repayments on this start from 2028. This will consume 10 per cent of the EU budget. They want to give money to Ukraine. In the next seven-year budget they’ll give 20 per cent of the budget through direct and indirect means. This means that 30 per cent of the budget is gone. Whoosh! It’s been taken out of the budget, we haven’t been able to use it for anything else – it’s gone. That leaves 70 per cent compared to what we had before. What’s more, we now want – and perhaps need – to spend a much higher proportion of this 70 per cent on defence. Now, if I take this into account, there will be less money for everything that was previously supported – such as rural development, cohesion funding and agriculture. This is why farmers are coming and saying, “No way! There may be new goals, but then find the money for them, or set aside separate funds for them.” It may be necessary to give money to Ukraine; I dispute that, but even if you think so, it definitely shouldn’t come from working farmers’ pockets. So this will be the curtain-raiser for a very serious wave of agricultural protests that will last for several years.
Yes, the biggest problem here, as I see it, is that Russian assets would once again serve as collateral for loans. So as the EU sinks into debt, they’re saying that the future of the EU is being mortgaged for many years to come – and someone will obviously have to pay this back, because they’re not giving this out of the goodness of their hearts. And then the next generation that comes along will be right to say, “Gentlemen, you’ve spent my future.”
Let’s understand what this is about, because I think you’re right. So, let’s say there’s 230 billion euros here on the table.
A nice, visible amount, yes.
The table would be too small for it, but it’s a nice amount. We could also take it and give it all to the Ukrainians. And then we’d have given them 230 billion euros. But we could also say that this company, this Belgian company, is giving the 230 billion euros to the European Union.
Yes?
The European Union says, “Okay, now we want to take out a loan, and this 230 billion euros is the collateral for the loan.” Then it’s no longer 230 billion euros that can be distributed or given to the Ukrainians, but even trillions – an amount exceeding a trillion; because it’s collateral, and for that the bank will give a larger loan. And then it’s not 230 billion, but more. The EU regularly does this: not giving money to someone, but using the money as collateral for loans and distributing the loans, with the consequence that, as you say, in the end someone will have to pay off the loan. And that someone will be our children and grandchildren. So, in fact, what the EU is doing now is nothing less than burdening children – European children and grandchildren – with debt for decades to come. They don’t have a problem with that. It pains me, I suppose it pains you too, but it doesn’t pain them. They support it, because they believe that the greater the collective debt is, the closer the cooperation within the Union can be. If the debt is shared, Member States will have less and less power, and a United States of Europe will be created. This is how the United States of America came into being, when the states began to take out joint loans and then found themselves unable to escape from that trap. So behind the war there’s a secondary idea. Europeans wholeheartedly support the war, but there’s another consideration behind it: war is the best excuse to burden the entire continent with debt, thereby eliminating the independence of nations and creating a United States of Europe. This is the long-held dream of the federalists.
Yes, if we look, for example, at domestic political issues, when we looked at the various details of the Tisza package and what proposals and tax programmes it contained, it was clear that this money and these incredible austerity measures – the 1.3 trillion forints that they talked about – would be used to finance the war. Because that’s what the EU has asked for: that the Member States – Hungary, say – should contribute this amount.
The thing is that they’re still waiting for the Member States’ parliaments to decide to give the money to Brussels, from where it can go to Ukraine. That’s how it is at the moment. That’s why they want him [Péter Magyar] to win, just as they wanted Márki-Zay to win. So this is why they always have a candidate. They pull a new prime ministerial candidate out of the hat – now we have another Márki-Zay, who, if he wins, would do what Brussels demands. But the goal is to get rid of national players. Right now the Hungarian or national parliaments still make the decisions, but there will come a time when we’ll have taken on so much debt that it will no longer be a question of whether or not we want to give money. They’ll say, “Folks, we’ve taken on the debt, it has to be serviced, so it doesn’t matter what the Hungarian parliament does, you have to give us the money. It’s no longer a sovereign decision.” The European bureaucracy is reaching into national budgets and saying, “You have to pay this, no matter what you think about it.” And, slowly but surely, national parliaments aren’t just becoming subordinate to Brussels, but they’re losing their significance. This is what it’s all about, this is what the story of the construction of this empire is about.
And then we look at the statements made by European leaders – I’m thinking primarily of the words of the NATO Secretary General, who’s said that Europe must prepare for a war on the scale of those experienced by our grandparents and great-grandparents. My grandfather fought in World War II. I remember what he told me about it, and he didn’t remember it fondly. So the most terrible thing is this kind of thinking, these words. What do you think it means when a NATO Secretary General, who was previously the Dutch prime minister, imposes this threat on European citizens?
This week I’d like to find out what’s going on in Brussels, because up until now the NATO Secretary General has always been primarily under American control. Now it seems that there’s a Euro–American conflict, with the NATO Secretary General representing the European position rather than the American one. This is a new situation. There’s never been anything like it before. This is also a serious threat to the Americans, because it indicates that the Americans have reached a point – as exemplified by the Secretary General’s words – at which NATO could suddenly be drawn into a war that the United States doesn’t want. This has never happened before. In other words, not since World War II has there been a situation in which the United States could be drawn into a war against its will. But now it seems that something like this is developing. This is where we need to start, and this is how we can understand the US National Security Strategy published last week; because the Americans don’t want to find themselves in such a situation. Returning to the NATO Secretary General’s historical reference, it’s wrong-headed. The Dutch probably didn’t have the same first-hand experience of war that we did, with the front line marching through our country, with the Germans coming in, followed by… In the Netherlands the Germans went in, followed by the Americans. In Hungary the Germans came in, followed by the Russians. Dear Dutch people, that’s a different experience, one that you didn’t have, but we did; so please don’t mention that period, because it means something different to us than it does to you. I’m sure it was also a time of suffering for you, but for us it was at least twice as painful. So I’m not sure you know what we think when you say things like that. That’s one. Two: there’s another problem. That war was a long time ago. Since then, new weapons have been developed – such as nuclear weapons, which didn’t exist at that time. So a war won’t look the same, or it may not look like World War II, which was fought with conventional weapons. There’s the constant threat that a war fought with conventional weapons could suddenly turn into a nuclear war – a limited or unlimited nuclear war. And then what will happen to us? So it’s not certain that this Dutch person knows what he’s talking about.
Yes, but reading through the National Security Strategy that you mentioned, which was put together by the United States, the destruction of civilisation that they mention, which may await Europe, is in fact a nuclear strike. That could bring this about, just as World War II brought about a kind of destruction of civilisation. I see this as a dramatic word, a dramatic assessment, but unfortunately a justified one. Do you think it’s justified?
I don’t think they’re referring to the destruction caused by war, but rather by migration. And I agree with that. The most surprising thing about this American document is that it seems as if we’d written it ourselves. And although I have a high opinion of the capabilities of the Hungarian intelligence services, it would be an exaggeration to say that we have that much influence. So I think the Americans wrote this themselves, but they came to the same conclusions as we’ve come to. I also think that Europe is undergoing a civilisational collapse – or I’d rather say that it’s undergoing a transformation. Traditional Western Christian values are disappearing, and are even being driven out of politics. In their place has come a liberal, global mindset, which has brought with it migration, with the current elite explicitly supporting the importation of migrants into Europe. And this migration and everything that goes with it, demographic changes, birth rates, and so on, all of this – together with the fact that Africa hasn’t even set off yet, because that’s where the really big masses will come from, and by then a reception centre will have been built for them here – could plunge Europe into a total transformation of civilisation, or even destruction, from a certain point of view.
Yes, but still... So it’s interesting what we see from here in Budapest, and it’s interesting what they see from Washington; but for me the most important question is always what they see from Brussels. The intelligence services are working there too. They’ve read this report that was written in the United States, but their response is that America shouldn’t interfere in European democracy. They’ve thanked Donald Trump for his opinion or comments, but they’ve said that Europe will decide things for itself, so to speak. What do you think about that?
Very good. I agree. Just make the right decisions. The problem is that they make decisions for themselves, but they make the wrong ones. But this isn’t the only decision they’re making. The American document is important because it shows that we haven’t been talking balderdash. We’ve been saying this for fifteen years, or at least since the migration crisis began in 2015; we were already saying in 2010 that a new world was coming, but since 2015 – since the migration crisis – it’s become completely obvious. So now it turns out that what we said – and what some Central European countries said – isn’t the opinion of an obscure, stupid leader who’s incapable of understanding reality, but that this is the situation. And the Americans see it this way too. Or at least – let’s be modest – a great power with significant intellectual capacity, such as America, can see the situation the way we do. In that case, maybe there’s something to it.
Last year you said that a change in the world order is taking place. We can talk about that now. We’re approaching the end of 2025. Do you think the outlines of this new world order are already visible, or is it still in a phase of disintegration, and is it still very inchoate, and unclear what form the new system – the new world order – will take?
I think what we’re seeing now, what we’ve been talking about so far – specifically about Russian assets, the destruction of European civilisation, migration and other issues – is already part of the new world order. I believe that the process is now underway, and if I understand them correctly, the Americans also believe that the era of globalist world governance is coming to an end, and will be replaced by the era of nations. So now we’re moving into a new world order based on national principles and national self-interest. This was demonstrated most powerfully and earliest by us Hungarians, but most powerfully and with the greatest symbolic force by the election of the new president of the United States. Think about it: the President of the United States has been in office for ten months – well, eleven; it feels like he’s been there for ten years, doesn’t it? So much has happened, so many changes have taken place. So this clearly shows that it wasn’t simply a case of the new US president coming in and taking action, but rather that processes that had already begun were strengthened by his arrival and are transforming the world. For example, these processes are leading us into a security, military, and war dispute between America and Europe, and they’re leading us into a confrontation between Germany and America – because, of course, it’s the Germans who are behind the entire European position. After all, Europe is now ruled by three Germans: the German chancellor, the President of the Commission, and the leader of the largest group in the European Parliament. Today these three people are leading Europe. And this has led us to where we are now, for example, in the relationship between the United States and the European Union. So this is the new world, this is how it will be – it won’t disappear, transatlantic unity won’t be restored. We have to live with the fact that there will be such disputes. The tariff dispute was a reflection of this. After all, the Americans imposed a 15 per cent tariff on us. They changed the relationship in a way that was favourable to them, so that we couldn’t defend ourselves. So these things happen all the time – they’re not extraordinary events, they’re just natural, everyday developments in this new era.
Yes, where does this “We couldn’t defend ourselves” mentality come from? Has Europe’s resilience and ability to assert its interests weakened so much? What caused this, this kind of “We couldn’t defend ourselves” mentality? Von der Leyen acknowledged with a resigned smile that Donald Trump had actually bulldozed his plan through.
We’re weak. So the situation is that while the United States has maintained its position in the global economy, accounting for 24–25 per cent of global production or trade, we’ve slipped from 25 per cent to 15 per cent. So, more than ten years ago America and Europe were in the same economic category. Compared to that, the Americans are up, we’re down, the Chinese have already overtaken us, and so on. So Europe’s constantly weakening. If you’re weak, your ability to assert your interests is also weak. Hungarian history provides a good example of this: weak Hungarian governments achieve weak results.
Yes, the important question now is how Hungary can break out of this situation – as you’ve mentioned – of being a small state. We know exactly what happened in Hungary in the 20th century; but it’s obviously still an open question as to how the 21st century can bring us the role, the historical opportunity, to break out of this post-Trianon, post-world war small state existence, and place Hungary in a completely different light, on a completely different level.
We know ourselves to be in another space, or we find ourselves in another space, like in science fiction films, when we suddenly find ourselves in place B instead of place A. This isn’t impossible – we’ve been doing this since 2010. I expected this, our analyses focused on this, our specialists, experts and researchers predicted this process. Of course no one knew that there would be a conflict in Crimea in 2014, or that there would be mass migration in 2015; but, based on the development of economic results, the Hungarians were right in their assessment of where the world was heading. Here I’m not talking about myself, but about those who work behind the scenes and prepare the analyses. And since 2010 government policy has been based on these forecasts. So, when we use that awful word “connectivity”, which is our official foreign policy doctrine, that’s already the answer to this question. I’ll translate it into plain language: we mustn’t shut ourselves off in a single bloc – and we mustn’t shut ourselves off in the European Union either. It’s true that we’re members, but we need relations with the United States. We need strategic relations, as deep as possible, with the Chinese – as you can see in the policy of eastward opening. And we won’t allow our Russian relations to be cut off by the European Union, because that would be a huge loss for Hungary. Let’s finally stand on our own two feet and build relationships with the Turkic and Arab worlds. So Hungary has been moving outward for more than ten years now: remaining in the European Union, but expanding its network of relations outside the European Union – and, in line with connectivity theory, building beneficial relationships with all the powerful players in the changed new world. This is how it can be done.
With regard to next year’s election, it’s very important to note that it won’t be an ordinary one: the stakes are incredibly high, and in the run-up to it, it’s clear that the atmosphere in Western Europe is already very tense. How do you think it will be different? Obviously every election is different, every parliamentary election is different; but how will next year’s election be special in this regard?
It’s both special and not special: “I love you, but I don’t.” So, on the one hand, it has the same structure as every election since 2015: Brussels wanted to overthrow the national government in 2018, and again in 2022. Brussels wants to overthrow every national government, partly because it needs imperial proconsuls, not sovereign nation states, and partly because an open conflict, a wound, a sharp break, a clear rift between Brussels and Hungary has opened up over migration. And since Hungary’s undisguised opposition to migration became clear, they’ve openly produced plans on how to finally replace the current national government with a left-wing, liberal, pro-Brussels government. There’s nothing new under the sun. It’s like the old circus productions I remember from childhood: at every election they try something, and if it doesn’t work “There’s another one!” They tried something in 2018, didn’t they? In 2022 they came up with Péter Márki-Zay, the opposition coalition, which didn’t work. So now they’ve pushed the opposition parties aside, created a new one, and pulled another one out of the hat – but essentially the same person. So from that point of view, nothing here is changing. The question is whether we want a patriotic government or a government that operates under the subjugation of Brussels. Whether we should go down the Brussels path, which I think will take us downhill, or continue on the Hungarian path that we’ve been following since 2010 – which I’m not saying is easy, but which at least takes us uphill. So in that sense there’s nothing new. But there are two aspects to this. The first is that, because of the war, Hungary is now confronting Brussels not only on migration, but also on the war. This means that a Member State can be right not only on individual issues, but now on all strategic issues of the last few years – it’s not Brussels that’s right, but those who oppose them, primarily the Hungarians. Just as we were right about migration, it’s now becoming clear that we’ve been right about the war as well. It was a mistake to side with Ukraine, it was a mistake to send so many weapons and money to Ukraine. The whole strategy was flawed. This isn’t our war. It should have been treated as a non-European war, and we should have helped to bring about peace not by pursuing our own interests through Ukraine, but by ending the war between two sovereign countries so that it would have as little destructive impact as possible on us, who are neighbours of these two countries. So here’s this classic predicament: “It would be good to wipe the Hungarians off the face of the earth now, so that we wouldn’t have to be reminded every day that we were wrong about migration, we were wrong about the war, and we were wrong about competitiveness.” And here’s the third thing, which is perhaps the most important: they’re preparing for war. So Europeans, and Brussels, think that war with Russia is inevitable – even desirable. They think in terms of war, in terms of the logic of economic warfare. We, on the other hand, are pro-peace. This is why the 2026 election will be the last election in Hungary before the war. In other words, now is our last chance to decide between war and peace. If we elect a pro-peace government there will be peace. If we elect a pro-Brussels government, there will be war.
Prime Minister, thank you very much for the interview.
Thank you too.
Thank you very much for your attention, and rest assured that we’ll be covering the EU summit on “Patrióta Extra”. My colleague Dani Bohár will be there on site, reporting live, and we’ll be producing a lot of material there as well. So watch Patrióta, and subscribe! Thank you for your attention. Bye for now!