Hungarian intelligence services were not interested in these two individuals because of their political affiliation, but because of their activities.
According to the partially declassified report published by the committee, the two IT specialists mentioned by Direkt36 were not simply tech workers who happened to assist the opposition. They were also working for Ukrainian intelligence, had been trained by them, and maintained close, regular contact with the Ukrainian embassy in Budapest. That alone places the case in a completely different category from the one Direkt36 is trying to sell.
The timeline matters as well.
In July 2025, a report was submitted to Hungary’s National Media and Infocommunications Authority alleging child pornography related conduct involving the same two individuals. Authorities acted on that report and carried out searches. During those searches, they seized data carriers and unauthorized military-grade equipment. Police are currently investigating the illegal possession of controlled military technology.
In practice, this means surveillance equipment. These were not harmless gadgets. They were tools capable of covert monitoring and interception, and the national security findings make clear that the two men were moving in circles where foreign contacts, intelligence-linked actors, and specialized capabilities were already part of the picture.
This is exactly what Direkt36 leaves out.
Instead, the outlet presents the case as though the authorities stumbled into a political trap and then refused to investigate a shadowy anti-Tisza operation. But the March 24 findings explain why the services were involved from the outset. The two individuals had foreign ties, embassy-level links, and connections to Ukrainian networks that represented a clear national security risk. One of them, according to the report, had been directed by a foreign intelligence- connected operative and had already established links with the IT Army of Ukraine. Both were involved in efforts to acquire spyware and other specialized tools, assisted by foreign intelligence contacts.
That is the real context of the case.
Direkt36 also wants the public to fixate on the fact that no child pornography material was found, as if that somehow invalidates everything else. It does not. The searches produced other serious findings, including unauthorized military-grade devices and evidence of foreign-linked operational activity. That is more than enough to explain sustained counter-intelligence attention.
There is a broader pattern here as well. The people now being defended by the Tisza-friendly press fit the same environment already visible in recent days: foreign-linked networks, technical operatives, political ties, and media cover operating in the same space. The Panyi recording exposed one side of that world. This case exposes another.
And now the effort is underway to launder the whole affair through sympathetic coverage.
The facts already made public tell a simpler story. These two men were not investigated because they helped Tisza. They drew the attention of the authorities because they had Ukrainian links, intelligence-adjacent contacts, and surveillance-related equipment in their possession.
That is why the services were dealing with them. And no amount of spin from Direkt36 can change that.